Reducing waiting time for elective surgeries by Popp, Alexandru
i 
 













Presented in Partial Fulfillment of Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Science (Business Administration) at 
Concordia University 













School of Graduate Studies 
 
This is to certify that the thesis prepared 
 
By:    Alexandru Popp 
 
Entitled:  Reducing waiting time for elective surgery 
 
and submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Master of Science (Administration) 
 
complies with the regulations of the University and meets the accepted standards with respect to 
originality and quality.  
 
Signed by the final Examining Committee:  
 
 
______Dr. Rahul Ravi_______________ Chair  
 
 
______Dr. Isabelle Dostaler__________ Examiner  
 
 
______Dr. Navneet Vidyarthi_________ Examiner  
 
 
______Dr. Kai Lamertz _____________ Supervisor  
 
 




Approved by  
   _________________________________________ 
Chair of Department or Graduate Program Director  
    
 
_____________ 2016  _________________________________________ 












Currently, the positioning of patients on elective surgical procedures wait lists is carried 
out through a decentralized approach involves a complex set of interactions between hospital 
capacities and patient demands in Quebec.  
The primary goal of the research is to determine if a centralized vs. the present 
decentralized organizational system is beneficial for the patients, in such a manner that the 
priority on the waiting lists of patients is updated to reflect the amount of time they have waited. 
The current study combines quantitative computer simulations and qualitative interviews that 
help in the understanding and interpretation of the simulations‘ results. The qualitative and 
quantitative results are triangulated in order to provide better analysis of the results. 
The qualitative portion of this examination, based on different literature reviews as well 
as on 12 interviews performed with the hospital‘s staff, aims at understanding the environment 
and what pressures the hospital staff face in their procedures to create the elective surgeries 
schedule. The results show that different surgical units within the same hospital have different 
methods to plan the surgical schedule.  
The quantitative analysis is based on simulating a centralized planning method of elective 
surgeries planning for five different surgical units in order to provide different perspectives vis-
à-vis the current decentralized planning method. The difference between the approaches is 
provided in order to obtain the best method that minimizes elective surgery waiting time, taking 
in consideration certain factors.  
The results of the simulations show that centralization is beneficial for certain surgical 
units and for specific indicators, where decentralization is beneficial for other units and/or 
indicators. However, there is no definitive overall conclusion that centralization is better than 
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Having access to surgery is becoming a scare resource in Quebec as the waiting time for 
elective surgery (ES) increases. This is the case in many Quebec hospitals, in many European 
nations, but also for the hospitals in the United States of America. The hospital model (that is 
different from the healthcare system) is extremely similar in all these settings and the approach 
taken to schedule elective surgeries is almost analogous.
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There are many issues regarding the difficulties of the current surgical planning system 
due to its decentralization of many processes. The competency of the planning method must be 
validated. It is this aspect that the new proposed planning system is addressing. It should be 
noted that there are other designs that could provide different descriptions and analysis. The 
current research focuses only on the decentralization and centralization of certain decisions 
regarding the manner in which elective surgeries are planned and scheduled. 
The research question that this study attempts to answer is: would a centralized elective 
schedule planning system provide better results for the primary stakeholders, the patients, 
regarding their surgery waiting time? Stated differently, would a centralized schedule planning 
method reduce the wait times for patients who are awaiting elective surgery?    
In order to respond to the needed re-structuring of the organization, much research has 
been done on decentralization and centralization decision making structures of healthcare 
organizations without any clear conclusions. Both Weinman et al. (1979) and Mechanic (1973) 
point out that decentralization is present in community organizations, yet large mental health 
organizations are inclined to use centralization. 
Surgery, having a very high status position, and operating time allocation are just part of 
the bigger hospital picture. Almost all surgical units in most hospitals behave in the same 
manner. This is so as ‗it is the system‘, ‗we must behave as others do in the system‘. The latter 
mentality is erroneous and infringes on the needed benefits of the patients.  
 There are different types of implications resulting from this research. Patient surgery 
wait time: ‗does centralization provide a shorter wait time in comparison with decentralization?‘ 
is the main question. Based on this, different structures might provide better results such as 
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shorter average and maximum or better utilization of the Operating Room  (OR) time (idle time 
and overtime).  Another aspect that is important is if centralization/decentralization is applicable 
to all the surgical units or only to some of them. Interactions between stakeholders: having a 
better grasp of the interactions between surgeons, nurses and administrators, the study provides 
insight regarding what is important for each type of actor. Having a grasp of ‗what‘ the 
differences between the centralized and decentralized decision-making are and ‗why‘ they are 
present may help understand how the system behaves and how it can be improved. 
Organizational structure: if the hospital‘s higher administration desires to make certain changes 
in the process structures regarding the scheduling of elective surgeries, it has all the information 
needed, may it be qualitative or quantitative, to make an educated decision.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
In order to answer the research question, if a centralized planning system would be 
beneficial for the reduction of waiting time for elective surgeries (ES), the following qualitative 
and quantitative approaches are devised. A thorough literature review is taking in consideration, 
thus forming the theoretical framework. Interviews with different staff of a major hospital in the 
Montreal region are performed in order to understand the planning processes, and potential 
issues regarding the ESs planning. On the quantitative front, different simulations are performed 
that mimic a centralized planning system. The results of these optimization-simulations are then 
compared with historical values, where the latter are the base line of comparisons. Currently, the 
hospital is considered to use a decentralized method for surgery planning; therefore, the 
comparison between the two systems is a comparison between 3 centralized scenarios with the 
present decentralized elective ES. The analysis of this research falls under the auspices of 
decision-support and not under decision-making. Stated differently, the research is not 
predictive; it has elements that are combined in a descriptive and prescriptive mold of the current 
ES planning situation in Montreal.  
The aim of the research is to analyze if a centralized planning system is more efficient 
and effective for patients who wait for their ES. In order to have a good understanding of the 
topic, different organizational theories are used in the analysis.  
For 4 out of the 5 surgical units under study, a centralized structure provides a shorter 
average waiting time for patients in comparison with the decentralized system. Yet, for the one 
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unit where the latter configuration is beneficial, the difference in the average wait time with the 
next best option (Scenario 1 Centralization) is only 3 days. Considering OR overtime, overall, 
centralization of decision making provides better results, yet different scenarios are better for 
different units. Regarding idle time, the historical values are better than any centralized scenario. 
It must be noted that the difference between some of the values is marginal. 
The overall simulations‘ results show that centralization is beneficial for certain surgical 
units and for specific indicators, whereas decentralization is also beneficial for other units and/or 
indicators. There is no definitive overall conclusion that centralization is better than 
decentralization or vice-versa. Each organizational structure works well in specific 
environments, under certain contingencies.  
The proposed research focuses on a potential reduction of ES waiting time in a major 
general hospital of Montreal, Quebec. Some of the recommendations and insights achieved by 
this study can be applied by different hospitals that use the same type of ES schedule planning. 
The analysis only takes in consideration elective surgeries and some of its components: 
patients, surgeons, nurses, administrators, five surgical units, OR allocation (space and time). 
The interactions between the stakeholders (surgeons, nurses, hospital administrators, patients) 
are highly dynamic and very complex. 
Broome (1999, p. 2) states that ―… the scarcity of resources forces a society to weigh up 
alternative possible uses for these resources…‖ In this statement, Broome underlines a few ideas. 
The ‗scarcity of resources‘ are the natural/environmental imposed situations. ‗Weigh(ing) 
alternative possible uses‘ is the descriptive and understanding of aspects of the world. 
Organizations are required to change because some resources become rare and/or they become 
more important than others. Healthcare centers are no exception. As previously mentioned, 
access to surgery is a scare resource in Quebec, and Canada. Table 1 provides the waiting time 
benchmark and the percentage of cases completed within the benchmark; Table 2 shows sample 







Table 1: Percentage of patients receiving care in priority areas, Canada, 2010* 
* McGurran 2013, p. 107 
 
Table 2: Procedures per 100,000 population (in-patient and day cases), Canada, 2000 and 
2009* 
* McGurran 2013, p. 102 
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It must be mentioned that this study only examines the OR schedule. It is not concerned 
with available beds in the ICU (after the surgery; in reality, if ICU beds are not available, a 
specific surgery will not be performed, making the availability of beds the bottleneck), OR 
resource availability (instruments, technical devices, etc.), staff availability, and many others. 
Even if this is the case, coordination still plays an important role in this study as the planning of 
surgeries is dependent on other surgeries, OR availability, available time for surgeries of 
different surgical units. Regarding the team coordination, it is not referring to the coordination of 
the surgical team in the OR, but to the coordination between surgeons-nurses-administrator in 
order to schedule a surgery. Furthermore, the performance of the actual surgeries, what happens 
in the OR or the outcome of the surgeries, is not considered in this study. The major focus of the 
analysis is what happens before people enter the OR; in other words, how a surgery got 
scheduled ‗in comparison‘ to another surgery and how the schedule gets built. 
Due to the complex nature of legal framework involved in hospital management, 
healthcare institutions have adopted some altered management practices and tools, according 
Lega and DePietro (2005). Consequently, the models can be broadly categorized in two different 
spectrums, namely the American and Anglo-Saxon model and the European heath system. The 
first model is defined by the role of physicians, who are paid a fee-for-services basis, managing 
the hospital resources such as beds, operating theatres, and technological equipment. In this 
model, the administrative department oversees nurses and other staff members. These are 
characterized by a financially aligned culture of the entire organization. Lega and DePietro 
(2005) label this model a ‗two-headed hospital‘ as it consists of two distinct hierarchical 
structures: one for the physicians, and the other for the remaining staff members.  
On the other hand, the European heath model is characterized by physicians on the 
hospital‘s payroll, and resources are allocated by the top management to the respective units. 
This particular system is a centralized system, where the Chief of each unit, the medical 
professional, is responsible for the access and distribution of the collective resources. Hence, it is 
also known as a ‗single-headed hospital‘, where the resources are evenly assigned throughout the 
hospital in a top-down manner.    
There are proponents that have a tendency to bureaucratize the health institution in order 
to have fair distribution of resources and accountability over the latter, and opposing this, there is 
the professionals‘ thirst for autonomy in their medical practice.  
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In his analysis, Litwak (1961) points out that there are two different systems 
implemented: medical and administrative. The reason why these different structures work in 
tandem in Litwak‘s (1961) study is that a pre-allocated distribution of authority is presented, 
imposed, and accepted by the employees; this means that the actors, their roles, responsibilities, 
and duties are clearly predetermined and stated. In different words, all know where they stand 
and what their duties are: the allocation of authority and its distribution were already 
institutionalized, and accepted by all those involved, concerned and affected by it. To this, ―there 
was little conflict between the two systems because management and workers had agreed in 
advance that interaction between one set of roles was to be handled by local discretion, but 
between another set of roles by centralized authority. Since the roles were clearly differentiated, 
it was possible to do this with minimal friction‖ (Litwak 1961, p. 183).  
For the purposes of this research, the hospital staff 
is divided in physicians, nursing staff and administrators; 
they form the triad forces (see Figure 1) in a hospital. It is 
the interactions between these groups, and their 
consequences that this research attempts to unravel. Even 
though there are some tensions between the triad forces, 
these are interactions that are worth mentioning as they are 
important and extremely dynamic. Eakin (1984, p. 222) 
illustrates very well the different lack of authority between 
two of the triad members: 
 
Administrators have the advantages of bureaucratic authority, administrative skills, and 
strategic organizational location, but their power is limited by their lack of ‗line‘ control 
over physicians and by their accountability to the board of directors. Similarly, the power 
of physicians is enhanced by their professional claims on clinical autonomy, but is 
constrained by their dependence on the hospital and by its budgetary and organizational 
restrictions.  
 
An important aspect to consider is that as hospitals grew their complexity also grew. 
Kingston (1983, p. 1165) is concerned about a very drastic element: ―forces exist which move 
hospitals away from a patient-care focus. Wilson (1982) has pointed to three systemic pressures: 
the preoccupation with resources and budgeting; the pressure for public accountability; and the 
demands for long-term planning in the face of changing governmental, especially financial, 
 
Figure 1: The triad forces 
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regulation.‖ One realizes that these pressures have an important role to play in the proper 
administration of a hospital.  
Sustainable healthcare ensures the delivery of better services while having minimal costs, 
it does not negatively impact other population systems (Schroeder et al., 2013), and minimizing 
waste. According to Schroeder et al. (2013, p. 183), there is ―no such thing called as waste, there 
are only ‗wasted resources‘‖. Radnor et al. (2012) point out that in healthcare, waiting is a waste 
as it relates to the waiting of the patient for its surgery. Furthermore, according to lean literature, 
underutilization rates for the OR is also considered a wasted resource as having a dedicated OR 
but no surgeries performed increases the costs for the hospital. Lean aims to optimize the usage 
of resources. Lean can be considered as the process of reconfiguring organizational mechanisms 
in hopes to reducing wastage, increasing efficiency and a culture of progressive improvement 
(Womack and Jones, 1996). 
Lean projects in healthcare are becoming increasingly widespread (Brandao de Souza, 
2009). His particular research highlights that the U.S. is the front-runner in this aspect, with 
approximately 57% lean projects, U.K. with 29%, and Australia with a nominal share of 4%. 
Cases such as the Virginia Mason Medical Center in Seattle (U.S.), Flinders in Australia and the 
Royal Bolton NHS Foundation Trust in the U.K. have become eminent examples of lean 
implementation in medical care institutions. In the cases mentioned above, and countless others, 
it is apparent that these projects have tremendous potential in terms of reducing cost and waste, 
enhancing efficiency of the organization and implementing dynamic and effective systems. Lean 
projects also offer some intangible benefits, which include greater employee morale and better 
patient satisfaction (Radnor and Boaden, 2008). 
According to the Canadian Institute for Health Information (2012), the total health 
expenditure in Canada, in current dollars, was $193.1 billion in 2010 (representing 11.9% of the 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)), and it was forecasted to reach $200.6 billion in 2011 and 
$207.4 billion in 2012. In 2002–2003, the operating rooms represented 5.9% of the hospital 
budgets in Canada, and in 2011, Canadian hospitals accounted for 29.1% ($58.4 billion) of 
national expenditure on health care, or about 3.4% of the 2011 GDP. It is due to these 
expenditures and their increase in the next years that new ways to enhance efficiency and 
sustainability are undertaken as one of the major priorities in Canada regarding hospitals (and 
healthcare in general) is the reduction of costs. 
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Even though ORs are the hospital‘s largest cost center, they are also the greatest source of 
revenue. As surgeries can cost between 9% and 15% of any hospital‘s annual budget which is 
provided by the different governments (federal and provincial)
3
, reducing the underutilization 
and overutilization of the OR has managerial, financial and operational implications in any 
hospital. This can only be accomplished with better scheduling planning, which is dependent on 
proper time estimation of the surgeries (duration), as well as their arrangement for the OR 
(sequencing). In other words, a cost effective OR can be achieved by shorter surgical durations, 
rational scheduling of various types of surgeries, and minimization of the non-operative time by 
reorganizing OR activities (Azari-Rad et al., 2013). 
Having a lean approach to the scheduling of elective surgeries would ensure that 
resources are utilized properly and that waste does not accumulate. As mentioned before, waste 
refers to wasted time, but also to all the unnecessary interactions between units and actors in 
order to come to the best schedule possible. All these interactions form an open system where 
informal dynamics are present. Furthermore, every actor and every unit involved in the OR or 
OR scheduling has its own goals to achieve.  
Albeit there being rapid medical and technological advances, the social aspects and 
relationships between the actors present in the hospital were and are extremely slow to develop. 
For this reason, one can state that the social organization of the hospital is lacking the social 
verve and vigor which characterizes the corporate world. Wilson (1963, p. 74) describes well 
two possible reasons why the hospital as an institution is so ‗special‘: 
 
… the hospital grew in haphazard fashion. It is probably the last major institutional 
complex in the modern West to accede to the bureaucratic patterning of work which has 
long characterized government, big industry, and other large organizations. There are two 
persistent reasons why the hospital can perhaps never approach the degree of formal 
controllability, of symmetrical power and task arrangements, which distinguishes 
industry and government. One is the nature of the work flow, the temporal and ethical 
constraints imposed by intractable human material: the patient. The other is the nature of 
the medical profession, which resists bureaucratization and is the unchanging repository 
of certain fundamental decisions about the care of the ill. 
 
Building on previous research, Kingston (1983, p. 1161) believes that ―one explanation 
of the poor implementation of organizational research studies may therefore be a soggy, 
                                                          
3




confused or incompetent client organization: the hospital itself.‖ Even if from the outside, one 
can see the hospital as a unitary actor, it is very hard to actually pinpoint to what type of actor it 
is as well as who is responsible/accountable: the board, the administrator, the physicians, the 
nurses, the patients? The correct answer is actually ‗it depends‘ on what a researcher is looking 
for, as the hospital is a conglomerate actor. 
This study is descriptive and exploratory and, to a certain extent, prescriptive. The first 
step is to comprehend in detail the reasons how and why the hospital works regarding ES 
planning. However, before full insight can be achieved, one must understand the main reasons 
why the hospital structures are configured in the manner in which they are. Once the theoretical 
aspects are uncovered, empirical exploration of the main interactions between stakeholders and 
units is carried out using data from direct interviews with some principal players within a major 
General Hospital of the Montreal region. The prescriptive aspect of the research is characterized 
by performing different computer simulations of a hypothesized centralized ES schedule 
planning. The results are compared with the historical data of the decentralized ES schedule 
planning.  
This research is organized in the following manner. The literature review is firstly 
concerned by a managerial perspective in a specific setting, which also describes the hospital‘s 
administration realm and the different hierarches present, but also by the need for coordination 
between the different stakeholders. Moreover, in order to funnel the research, different 
centralization and decentralization structures are analyzed within the context of a hospital. These 
different structures are important as they determine distinct resource allocation methods. This 
gives rise to the main setups of organization, of which in this case, are based on a bureaucratic 
approach. Bureaucracy plays an important role in any hospital; however, because the hospital is a 
specialized institution, which caters potential conflicts between different power structures and 
power plays of the actors involved, the professional bureaucracy is also studied. Even if the 
hospital is a bureaucratic organization, as different professional groups are vividly present and 
affect the manner in which surgeries are planned based on their goals, the social factors and 
differences that affect the interactions between some of the professional groups are also studied.  
Regarding the qualitative portion of the research, there were 12 interviews that were 
performed with different professional staff of the hospital. The interviews are analyzed by 
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surgical unit, by different groups of professionals and their input regarding a potential 
centralization of the elective surgeries booking.  
On the quantitative side, different computer simulations models were performed. The 
data provided by the latter is analyzed using different indicators; however, the main variable 
which this research focuses on is the average waiting time of patients for their ES.  
Furthermore, the results of the simulation are combined with the information provided by 
the interviews of the hospital‘s staff. A comparison between the different five surgical units 




Daft (1991) maintains that organizational design refers to the assigning of tasks to certain 
individuals and sub-units within an organization, representing responsibilities, authority levels, 
degrees of control, and hierarchy. It is this design that is the key factor in the efficiency of the 
organization. Building on Davis and Marquis (2005), important economic and social inquiries for 
the current study can be answered by institutional theory and organization theories as the former 
greatly influence the outcomes/procedures that can be seen in organizations.     
In today‘s economic environment, competition is fierce and organizations need to adopt 
changes in order to adapt, to be more agile, to secure resources, simply put, to be in business 
tomorrow. Healthcare centers are no exception. Every organization must look to accomplish the 
following tasks, as per Perrow‘s (1961, p. 856) research:   
 
1) ―Secure inputs in the form of capital sufficient to establish itself, operate, and expand as 
the need arises;  
2) Secure acceptance in the form of basic legitimization of activity;  
3) Marshal the necessary skills;  
4) Coordinate the activities of its members, and the relations of the organization with other 
organizations and with clients or consumers.‖  
 
It must be noted that these four items are not likely to be equally important at any point in time. 
In the multi-level, multi-dimension organization, there are multiple legitimatization 
rationalities. Taking in consideration Scott‘s (1995, p. 140) observation that ―institutional rules 
invent rationality‖ and legitimize it, different questions need to be considered: how are conflicts 
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resolved between the primary stakeholders; how do these conflicts arise, taking in consideration 
that they are caused by institutional rationalities; and, what are those institutional rationalities. 
In their article about typology and measures used for studying professional and 
administrative organizational models, Bunderson et al. (2000) introduce four models of 
organizations: the bureaucratic system model, the market enterprise model, the professional 
group model, and the community service model. These models are distinguished by internal and 
external division of managerial and professional logics. The information received from the 
authors‘ survey shows that these models and their constructs are generalizable across all 
occupational groups and are stable across time, providing valuable tools in the analysis of 
complex organizations. 
Bunderson et al. (2000) found that administrative and professional perspectives can take 
both internal and external forms. The distinction between the four organizational models 
recognizes different characteristics of these models as some deal with issues of internal 
coordination, and others are related to the matters of external adaptation. Depending on which 
issues are more vital, this can mean different approaches to organizational goals, functions and 
rules (Miller, 1992; Perrow, 1961; Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1983). The authors explain how their 
organizing models compare to internal and external divisions of professional and administrative 
models: 
 
 The bureaucratic system model (administrative internal) views the organization as an 
efficient and coordinated system organized to pursue common goals. The market 
enterprise model (administrative external) views the organization as a business enterprise 
organized for competitiveness and wealth maximization. The professional group model 
(professional internal) views the organization as a collegial society organized to promote 
consistency and quality in the work of a particular occupation. Finally, the community 
service model (professional external) views the organization as a foundation organized to 
apply professional expertise for the benefit of the larger community or society. 
(Bunderson et al. 2000, p. 369) 
 
Bunderson et al. (2000, p. 366) notice that professional models highlight authority which 
is based on ―technical competence, commitment to the work, collegial decision making, and a 
service orientation‖. On the other hand, administrative models stress authority based on the 
duties of a legally defined office, as well as commitment to the organization, hierarchically based 
decision making and orientation towards efficiency (Gouldner, 1957; Parsons, 1947; Van 
Maanen and Barley, 1984). With the rise of the percentage of workforce involved in professional 
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and technical work, tension between these models and between the people belonging to different 
‗systems‘ becomes an important element in the increasing number of organizations. 
The market enterprise model according to Bunderson et al. (2000) perceives the 
organization as a business, a corporation, which is organized for competing, growth and 
accumulation of wealth. This model represents the external element of administrative rationale. 
In the market enterprise model an organization needs to compete more efficiently than the other 
businesses and tries to satisfy the consumer. The model is highly dependent on the market 
demand, and organizations adapt their supply accordingly. The consumer is the one in control, 
not the employees or managers. Everything inside the organization, from what and how work is 
performed, to the products/services and their value, is in function of the market demand. 
Therefore, it is characterized by a lean pull-system, and it requires flexibility towards the 
consumers‘ demands. 
The community service model is based on a view that the organization is a foundation, 
created to apply professional knowledge and expertise for the greater good, that is, for the benefit 
of society as a whole  (Bunderson et al., 2000). This model advocates serving the community for 
a simple reason – it is the just thing to do. It represents the external orientation of the 
professional approach. Altruism and serving the community conquers egoism, the self-interest, 
profit and efficiency. The idea is to encourage professionals to recognize their personal and 
social obligations and rely on them, rather than on their performance. ―In this way, 
professionalism not only becomes a cultural template for organizing work but also becomes a 
valued cultural resource for society (Barley and Tolbert 1991, p. 5)‖ (Bunderson et al. 2000). 
The bureaucratic system model perceives an organization as a system which is organized 
to persist on achieving common goals that are planned and ordered by legally appointed officials. 
It spreads out work from person to person, from unit to unit, and then integrates this work in the 
most efficient way. This is achieved by division of labor, hierarchy, specialization for performing 
specific tasks and finally, a clear distinction of official duties and personal interests. Integration 
can only be attained if there is universality and formality, and if rules and policies are enforced. 
Rights and duties of each position are specified by abstract rules, and recruitment and promotion 
are regulated by a special administrative staff. Bunderson et al. (2000) have the same approach 
regarding this model as the Weber‘s bureaucracy. 
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The professional group model views an organization as a society of colleges, who are 
assembled to ensure consistency and quality in their profession and to support these 
professionals in their work. The notion here is that only people who possess adequate knowledge 
and skills can decide about members of the group and how their work should be done and 
evaluated. Thus, professionals seek to build their organizations in such a way that allows them to 
preserve their control over their work and to judge what is best for their clients. For these 
reasons, the professional groups can be understood as guilds.  
Having the same rationale as Bunderson et al. (2000), Comstock and Scott (1977) find it 
obvious that different types of work require different types of organizations. Routine work 
benefits from bureaucratic organizations, while work that is less predictive is done more 
effectively in the flexible, less hierarchical surrounding. 
Furthermore, there are three other models that can explain how an organization could be 
structured. These are very well described by Litwak (1961, p. 177): 
 
Weber's model is most efficient when the organization deals primarily with uniform 
events and with occupations stressing traditional areas of knowledge rather than social 
skills. The human-relations model will be most efficient for dealing with events which 
are not uniform (research, medical treatment, graduate training, designing) and with 
occupations emphasizing social skills as technical aspects of the job (as that of 
psychiatric social worker, salesman if there is little differentiation in the products, and 
politician). […….] Since they are conflicting, what characterizes this third model 
[professional model] and distinguishes it from the other two is a need for ‗mechanisms of 
segregation‘. These permit mutually antagonistic social forms to exist side by side in the 
same organization without ruinous friction. [Emphasis in original] 
 
In today‘s hospitals, all these three models are present at the same time and work in parallel, 
aside from other micro and meso levels of interactions. This also adds to the complexity of 
understanding this institution. It is one of the main reasons why the analysis of the hospital as a 
unitary actor is so complex and not many researchers venture in examining it. 
The uniform event has the following characteristics: the same assignment is frequent, and 
it is important. Usually, it is performed by highly skilled workforce (i.e., doctor/surgeon, 
research scientist, soldier in combat) in an environment that is constantly changing; adaptation is 
required. There are no standardized problems/circumstances such as in the case of an 
administrator of a utility company under pre-established guidelines, a soldier in peacetime, a line 
manager of an assembly line (Litwak, 1961). 
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Having non-uniform events in a hospital setting, one must take into consideration the 
socialization and interaction aspects of the actors involved. Although medical or technological 
advancements are made, these are still being implemented by humans, demanding thus that the 
human aspect cannot be ignored. Furthermore, Litwak (1961) also believes that non-uniform 
events will increase in future organizations. There are constant social changes as the actors learn 
and adapt to technology and the social interactions are in constant flux.   
Even though there are variations within each sub-group, the main structures in which 
organizations are setup are the following: functional – organized around the resources available; 
divisional – organized around the outputs of the firm; and, matrix – organizations organized 
around both inputs and outputs. Hospital managers are quite fond of the matrix structure, which 
allows them to sync their main objectives, because: 
 
i. it avoids wasting resources through duplication; utilization of the resources in the most 
efficient manner; 
ii. it provides the highest level of patient-care, thus maintaining and increasing the hospital‘s 
image.     
 
Yet, there are also weaknesses in a matrix organization, such as: double authority line (which is a 
source of potential conflict); it is slow in coordination of efforts; it may be unstable; it is costly 
(Creteur and Pochet, 2003).  
 Different types of healthcare institutions are organized in different manners in order to 
offer the services required to their constituents. The general hospital provides the most 
complicated structure as it is supposed to tender to a multitude of stakeholders. Due to the 
latters‘ different goals and requirements, the general hospital needs to use all the previously 
mentioned models: market enterprise, community service, bureaucratic system and the different 
professional groups‘ segregation. It is under the umbrella provided by the combination of these 
models that the hospital under study operates.  
 It is easy to see that the management, and especially the coordination, of all the resources 





A properly run hospital must have an equilibrium and all the actors must accept that 
without all the pieces, representing all the actors, any hospital will not function properly. The 
most drastic consequence of a poorly run hospital is its closure, an effect that is felt by all those 
who work in the specific hospital. To a certain extent, paradoxically, it is the administrator who 
is supposed to implement and enforce it. Kingston (1983, p. 1159) also concurs with this idea as 
he states that ―organization is about the regulation of human behavior for social purposes. It 
therefore mediates between policy (social purposes) and the delivery of health care to patients 
(human behavior). Rather, it is a framework constructed out of values, both individual and social, 
which should facilitate the work to be done.‖ 
Organization theory has evolved to a point where there seems to be a best line of action 
for any circumstances or events, and the evolution of organizational theory has reached a 
superior state (Kast and Rosenzweig, 1974). Many researchers, including Aldrich (1975), believe 
that the evolution of organizational theory is based on environmental fit, and so, the correct 
combination of environment states and organizational behavior will align perfectly to produce 
enhanced results, falling thus under contingency theory. 
Consequently, management can become a computational activity if the manager is more 
interested to controlling the destiny of the company, which is in fact the best case scenario 
(Bourgeois, 1984). The rationale for this is that circumstances hinge on environmental, human 
and technical factors, all reducing significantly the choice-element from the manager‘s job. 
Worst case scenario could be that it becomes more of a waiting game, demanding reactive 
actions from the manager. It may be strongly argued that these particular thoughts are 
indispensable for empirical research purposes; however, their reductionism eradicates the 
fundamental characteristics of strategic management, eventually obstructing the academic 
growth prospects of the discipline of strategic management.   
The real purpose and need for management in hospitals and healthcare institutions is not 
just to cut costs and govern things smoothly, but to improve the level of health and medical care 
being provided to the patients. For this purpose, enhancement of access to medical care is as vital 
as any role that the manager may have (Sheps, 1972).   
At the same time, Chervenak and McCullough (2001) maintain that the primary focus of 
management has always been to protect and improve the economic interests of the organization 
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by utilizing leadership skills and experience. Traditionally, insurance companies have unlimited 
funds, and so the job of the manager had little significance in the economic aspects; this results 
in the selection process of the administrative staff requiring fewer skills. After the advent of the 
many forms of managed-care, alterations in the medical care reimbursements, and others, the 
management skills required to succeed as a physician-leader has risen exponentially. 
Conventional management styles that had been successful in the past are increasingly likely to 
fail in today‘s world of quality and cost management. Furthermore, Hall (1972) explains that the 
autocratic leadership is better suited for the ―highly formalized, routinized, and centralized, that 
is, a mechanical type of organization‖ (Hage and Dewar 1973, p. 280-281) and that the 
persuasive/supportive leadership is more appropriate in ―a decentralized, fluid, innovative, or 
organic type of organization.‖ 
In the 1990s, the change in governance of healthcare systems has supported the 
employment of industrial means of managing resources and personnel, sometimes encroaching 
upon the boundaries of clinicians and doctors (Beardwood et al., 1999). The new method of 
management tends to focus on realizing the objectives of the firm, at the same time evaluating 
the performances of the staff, including the physicians. It can be said that a specialized domain is 
incorporated in the medical care institution, where stress is laid on the administration to protect 
the institution, and enhance the performance that includes providing quality care and restricting 
wastage of funds (Campbell, 1994; Choiniere, 1993; Kelly, 1991; Nettleton, 1995). A separate 
perspective on this narrative is the fact that whether the new management procedure is indeed 
appropriate and necessary, as the professional effectiveness of the physicians is complicated to 
quantify in terms of cost. 
Mauksch (1973) state that there is an assumption that the performance and output of the 
hospital is seen as the direct responsibility of management, and it attests to the skill and talent of 
the professionals associated with the organization. This particular assertion can be misleading, 
and most people believe that patient care is sometimes independent of the quality of 
administration. Numerous organizational factors are involved in forming a protocol within an 
organization, and often factors beyond control are introduced as variables, making it increasingly 
difficult to judge the quality of administration and healthcare being provided to the patients. The 
net effect is the interaction of various contributing factors, including roles, tasks, systems, 
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structures, ideologies, class-distribution, moral ethics, competence, etc. To pin-point a certain 
element in isolation can be hypocritical and misleading.    
It is hard to understand why hospitals are not being controlled by the medical staff, 
especially considering the complexity of their jobs, specialized skill set, strong professional 
background and the power of organized medicine (Perrow, 1961). Physicians are afforded a 
certain prestige and status, and they are structured in such a way to be easily managed (by 
another doctor). A hospital is organized based on hierarchy and bureaucracy consisting of 
different committees and boards who decide rewards and sanctions. Since physicians are the 
ones who perform both staff and line functions, it is foremost their ‗right‘ to have a say in the 
control of the affairs. Finally, doctors have an economic interest in the functionality of a hospital, 
as this not only advances their career, but also helps their private practice. Hence, a case can be 
made for doctors to have control over hospital affairs governance as they possess the knowledge 
and skills in order to prosper as professionals. In some cases, doctors are given the liberty to 
exercise complete control over their fields, and thus the role of the administrator becomes that of 
a superintendent. Nonetheless, in this case, the administration‘s stance may be overlooked and 
the long term objectives of the institution ignored. More often than not, this superintendent type 
of administrator position is fulfilled by a nurse.     
It is easy to acknowledge that the hospital as an institution is greatly different in 
comparison with any other organization type. For this reason, the proper management – 
including the leadership component – of any hospital must ensure that the hospital responds to 
the needs of all its stakeholders, which are very diverse and that have in many cases, 
contradictory goals. Thus, the administration of a hospital is tasked to provide, as best as it can, 
the tools, devices and means to accomplish specific objectives.  
However, one of the reasons why ‗hospital administration‘ is so difficult to analyze, in 
Wilson‘s (1963, p. 68) perspective, is that ―the human being who is educated or healed is not a 
thing but a process, and it is difficult to point to him as the concrete output of a work pattern.‖ It 
is very hard to point to the ‗patient-product‘; the hospital does not manufacture anything per se. 
It is ‗in the business‘ of providing specialized services since the hospital is characterized as part 
of the service industry. Furthermore, coordination is one of the most important aspects in today‘s 
general hospital because there are various professionals with various duties within various 
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departments. The coordination duty falls to the administrator who must take in consideration 
challenges to authority, and make sure that the entire system works well and is synchronized.    
Furthermore, different fields require different perspectives in their analysis. According to 
Becker and Stafford (1967), the economists are more concerned with the profitability of the 
organization, market position and size of the market it captures. On the other hand, sociologists 
tend to focus on the administrative size, room for innovation, formal and informal structure, 
bureaucratization, etc. The psychologist however, restricts his examination to the inter-group and 
intra-group interactions, which take place within any organization.  
An increase of the size of the hospital, and thus of the administration elements of the 
latter, require a multifaceted system of interactions and communications between different levels 
of the hospital (Anderson and Warkov, 1961). Furthermore, in today‘s general hospital the 
coordination activities also become more essential and intricate, thus requiring the administration 
component to be even more complex and more focused on the necessary elements.  
Building on Wilson‘s (1963) idea that the physician is a ‗guest‘ of the organization, this 
is still valid today for different reasons. One of them is that the physicians are not employees of 
the hospital: they provide their cases/patients seen directly to the government, which the latter 
provides the hospital with the funds in order to pay them. Furthermore, a physician can actually 
be tied to different hospitals, depending on his availabilities as well as those of the hospitals‘ or 
clinics‘. There are no direct ties that link the physician to Hospital X as an institution per se. The 
hospital is just the provider of facilities where the physician performs his duties. Thus, the two 
main elements of the hospital organization (the patient and the physician) are just temporarily 
attached to the physical aspects of the hospital: the building. This is another reason why the 
administration of a hospital has difficulty in addressing certain issues with the physicians. As the 
latter are not direct employees of the institution, there are no penalties that the administrator can 
impose if the former do not apply the rules of the organization; thus, physicians have a free-wild-
card where only in extreme abuse cases (power, status, medical) are penalized by the Collège des 
médecins du Québec (in Quebec). 
One can notice that there is a trend, even more pronounced today, that administration is 
gaining territory in the hospital, power and prestige wise, fact that McKee (1970) already 
acknowledged noticing the social structure changes that took place since 1955. The hospital 
administrative ‗profession‘ is rather new as it is only from 1946 that it became prevalent when 
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formal training started (McKee 1970, p. 26), and its beginnings were slow. In the U.S., the same 
characteristics were still present during 1970s, where only 21 educational institutions graduated 
around 200 people for this essential ‗profession‘ (McKee 1970, p. 28). Today, the situation is 
better, however the hospital administration as a recognized field still lacks in its reputation.  
Being a new specialty, administration does not have the same status and respect as its 
medical counterparts. The expansion of the administration‘s tasks and obligations in today‘s 
hospital pushes towards a professional administration.  
It can be rightfully argued that because there are different stakeholders within the 
hospital, each with their own level of authority and each with direct control over certain specific 
resources, a hierarchy is created.  
Freidson (1978) maintains that one of the main concerns of academic-hospital-state 
institution is initializing administrative, legal and economic structures in order to manage and 
coordinate the health services distribution and quality, within a financial mindset. Those who 
provide the services – physicians, nurses, technicians – are considered a different segment that is 
pushed towards ‗nominal bureaucratization‘ (Freidson 1978, p. 979). Due to the divisions‘ 
functional and hierarchical setups, different occupations compete for authority and legitimization 
within and between their jurisdictions. Physicians oversee the primary service providers. Due to 
their ‗position‘, the physicians are tasked with assigning duties, and overseeing the health 
services provided within the hospitals. Furthermore, the specialists, such as dentists, 
chiropractors, podiatrists, OR nurses, are also a separate segment, autonomous in their own right. 
This is one of the reasons why it is critical to set boundaries when it comes to observing groups 
(Borgatti and Halgin, 2011). Furthermore, although the unit managers and administration 
personnel are most likely to be physicians themselves, they nonetheless represent a completely 
different segment within the stratum of the health care profession (Freidson, 1978).  
 Litwak (1961, p. 178.) believes that ―permitting each individual to control decisions on 
the job indicates a trend toward a colleague rather than a hierarchical relationship.‖ This is what 
is supposed to happen in a regular, normal institution under normal and fair play circumstances. 
However, the hospital is all but that. There are different hierarchies present in the general 
hospital, and some units are able to control certain decisions. Permitting limited control over 
particular decisions makes sense from a medical perspective, as for example, the cardiology unit 
cannot interfere in another unit, or vice versa. However, this is just a segregation of expertise, 
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similar to the Weberian model or the professional model previously mentioned. Litwak (1961, p. 
181) acknowledges this when he states that ―hierarchical relations may well lead to efficiency 
when the job is defined by traditional areas of knowledge.‖  
 Eakin (1984) illustrates very well the different authorities (or lack thereof) between and 
of the triad members stating that the administrator of a medical unit has certain bureaucratic 
authority and administrative skills, yet these are limited by the control of the administrator over 
the physicians and nurses; the physicians have legitimacy over the medical decisions and clinical 
authority, but they are limited by their accountability to the hospital and formal organizations 
outside the hospital (Collège des médecins), and dependent by the resources of the hospital (e.g., 
access to the OR); nurses are also reliant on the resources of the hospital, controlled by 
administration, and obeying the orders of the physicians regarding the treatment recommended 
by the latter for individual patients.  
March and Simon (1958) are of the opinion that the purpose of a hierarchy within an 
organization is to pass the organizational goals across the staff members in such a manner that 
their behaviors are governed by the objectives set by top management.  
 McKee (1970) suggested that dual accountability (clinical and administrative) can be 
implemented as a system, ultimately helping patient care, by providing various checks and 
balances as in Litwak‘s (1961) study. In this particular scenario, the administrator is tasked by 
keeping the physicians, nurses, clinicians, and technicians in line, and to resolve the conflict in 
the best possible manner to maintain the efficiency of a unit.  
Furthermore, there are two very important aspects that can be considered the roots of the 
struggle between these two professional classes, nurses and physicians:  
1) ―the fantasy of medicine and the idealization of the physician‖, described by Peeples and 
Francis (1968, p. 35) as ―the work of physicians tend to be regarded by laymen … as a 
glamorous drama in which physicians lead a grand assault on disease. Nurses are seen in 
the fantasy as depending entirely on the perception and orders of the physician,‖ fact 
which is not true;  
2) ―Physician: the natural leader of the Health Team‖ described by the authors as the belief 
of the physicians that it is they who should be the team leader, despite the fact that they 
spend a very short amount of time with the patients in comparison with the ward nurses, 
and it is the physicians who should coordinate the healing process.  
21 
 
Regarding the second point, both the nurses and physicians have different views on what is 
important to the patient, and the nurses do not appreciate it when someone imposes something 
just on the status basis.  
McKee (1970) also adds a different perspective by maintaining that, as the physician is 
not an actual employee of the hospital, the administrator is seen as interfering or restricting 
physicians‘ duties. It must be pointed out that it is the duty and responsibility of the administrator 
to provide the resources for the physician to accomplish his work, and the former must see the 
‗big picture‘ and provide the medical staff with what it requires. This also includes balancing 
unit/departmental access to resources, and not only accomplishing medical staff/personnel 
requirements.  
 However, Hewett et al. (2009, p. 1733) argue that clinical work encompasses negotiations 
between all the actors and ―where the absence of explicit rules continual bargaining and 
negotiations characterize the organizational life of a hospital.‖ This is so due to the nature of the 
service provided to its clients: the patients. Not one individual is able to answer all the needs of 
the client, requiring thus team-work. The negotiation can be extremely demanding, as a result of 
different power structure, power status, different goals, and others. Sometimes, the negotiations 
actually fail, to the detriment of the patient.  
According to Chervenak and McCullough (2001), leadership needs to be based on values 
that provide appropriate direction for exercising influence and control in a constructive manner. 
Leaders need to be competent in the management of resources and employees. Since the 
managers have superior influence and authority to exercise power, they must exercise it through 
an ethical prism. The most basic parameter needs to be the right of the physician to exercise 
authority when it comes to protecting the interests of the patients. This aspect is mentioned and 
upheld by all the surgeons interviewed for this study. Engel (1969) believes that autonomy exists 
on an individual level as well as on the group level. Individual autonomy can be described as the 
individual‘s control over his work and activities on a professional level, entailing the right to deal 
with patients with freedom. On a group level, autonomy can be described as its role in 
influencing and controlling the activities of the entire profession. Yet, this autonomy also 
depends on the manner in which it is used. The concept of medical ethics requires the virtues of 
self-effacement, self-sacrifice, compassion and integrity. The physician can define and uphold 
professionalism in healthcare institutions by applying the aforementioned virtues. On the other 
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hand, there are also vices that can corrupt: unnecessary bias, self-interest, corruption, and 
callousness (Chervenak and McCullough, 2001).  
Bates and White (1961) focus on how the ability to make decisions, exercise authority 
and control were subjective to each triad group, with each group trying to increase their power 
and control in the proceedings; this is viewed as an imposition by the other segments. However, 
most parties involved believe that the administration should have enough authority to make 
tough decisions, and doctors should have a say in the surgical procedures. The main problem is 
between the administration and physicians. Additionally, Bates and White (1961) also found in 
their study that there is no agreement regarding the financial management and operating 
schedules. The nurses and administrators have almost the same positive perceptions regarding 
other groups; yet, the physicians are thought of as selfish and opinionated, failing to follow 
orders, rejecting any kind of feedback from other parties. Building on the work of Bates and 
White (1961), McKee (1970) concludes that one of the major concerns in the healthcare system 
is the distinctive perceptions of the different segments involved. Physicians, nurses, and 
administration have all been known to view the control hierarchy in separate ways. This is 
confirmed latter by Bunderson et al. (2000) who explore the topology that provides a reference 
frame for comparison and analysis into differences in ideology that may exist across 
organizations and amongst individuals of different segments of the work force.  
Mauksch (1973) is of the opinion that healthcare requires not only the individual‘s effort, 
but also a mandate that needs to be followed and implemented in order to have the best 
outcomes. He further states that the sub-entities involved in the healthcare system are equally 
important, as they have their respective functions, which need to be carried out, in terms of 
realizing the larger objective with this work. The different groups (surgeons and nurses) are 
crucial in understanding their respective interactions, the team-work required to take care of 
patients. Isolating these two parties will not provide a clear picture. If nurses are the focal point, 
it is complicated to comprehend the scope of their interaction with the physicians, which in itself 
is a separate segment. Similarly, paying attention to doctors alone will not provide sufficient 
insight into their dealings with the nurse-staff, and hence to actually develop a holistic 
framework of the involvement and functionality of sub-entities on their own, as well as a group, 





As it was noticed that there are different hierarchies, and staff that is specialized in very 
specific mediums and components, the administration of the hospital must focus on one of the 
crucial aspects that keeps the hospital running efficiently: coordination of resources. The 
coordination effort falls under the auspices of the administrator, may he belong to a specific 
surgical unit, or part of the ‗bigger picture‘, one unit that concentrates on the overall coordination 
between different units.  
Obtaining economies of scale utilizing contingency theories and in the context of 
resource expenditure requires intricate working, and it is often complicated to ascertain. Since 
resources are procured for various sub-divisions within a company, duplication of effort is 
common. Moreover, sub-divisions and individuals are only aware of their own roles, seemingly 
unaware of the larger picture, possibly resulting in ‗missed targets‘ at the organizational level. 
This is one of the reasons why the actual application of contingency theory in the real world is 
difficult. True and valid coordination of resources and information is hard to achieve, yet they 
are the main ingredients that can hold structures together.  
Moch and Morse (1977) believe that organizations which are functionally differentiated 
call for greater integration and increased coordination among the different subunits and/or 
departments. Different units within an organization, although functionally independent, generally 
tend to compete for the same resource pool (Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967). The significance of 
optimal resource allocation becomes more complicated when the number of units competing for 
the same resources increases. Hence, optimum allocation and utilization of resources requires 
strict control and monitor protocols.     
At the same time, Perrow (1961) is of the view that administrative dominance hinges on 
coordinating complicated procedures and complex tasks. This is the case because physicians are 
not always able to manage large number of supporting staff members involved in the process. 
Furthermore, Perrow (1961) suggests that administrators are in an excellent position to control 
and govern not only the personnel, but also the practices, freeing the physicians of the mundane 
tasks. Having this approach, the latter can utilize their time elsewhere. This was confirmed by 
most interviewed physicians of the present study. The high functionality often demanded by 
physicians can be mitigated to some extent, by providing support in times of conflict. Rico et al. 
(2008) focus on the dynamic adjustment which impacts on implicit coordination, similar to 
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Weick and Roberts (1993) who studied the effect of the collective mind, and Gersick and 
Hackman, (1990) who researched on habits and routines of the taskforce.  
Rico‘s et al. (2008) work highlights the assistance to the theory of implicit coordination. 
They find that teams develop tendencies which become habit or routine (Gersick and Hackman, 
1990), with work distributions and interrelation patterns amongst the different members of the 
team (Gersick, 1988; Weick and Roberts, 1993), and irregular and less frequent group 
discussions about strategies necessary to determine a joint task (Hackman and Morris, 1975). 
Team coordination can only be completely comprehended once cognitive structures and 
processes employed by the team members are carefully evaluated in greater detail, (Fiore and 
Salas, 2004; Gibson, 2001; Marks at al., 2000; Marks et al., 2002; Mathieu et al., 2000).  
The overall model of the research conducted by Rico et al. (2008) is based upon the 
increase in understanding of the team members coordinated functions, eventually leading to 
enhanced team work and improved coordination amongst the taskforce. Implicit coordination 
involves some of the most dynamic aspects of team work, as well as taking into account the 
behaviors of the task force, and how they adjust as a collective entity. This is an important factor 
that surgeons mentioned when interviewed: the surgeons prefer to perform a surgery with the 
best team available. There are situations when a surgery is postponed because a surgeon does not 
have a ‗perfect team‘ (from his perspective) in the OR. 
According to Rico et al. (2008), the two most significant elements that contribute towards 
implicit coordination are dynamic adjustment and anticipation, which are derived from team 
structure and team members‘ knowledge. To be able to model implicit team work, the role of the 
team members and the nature of their knowledge need to be fully appreciated (Cannon-Bowers et 
al., 1993; Klimoski and Mohammed, 1994; Kraiger and Wenzel, 1997). Furthermore, Rico et al. 
(2008) state that in fully functional and optimally performing teams, each individual member is 
aware of the overlapping or shared efforts, and have a greater understanding of their own 
responsibilities.  
Rico et al. (2008) believe that the content of the information and knowledge depends on 
the team‘s roles and functions; yet, in order for the team members to develop implicit 
coordination, the content that becomes pertinent is the environment in which the team members 
are participating, their specific roles and finally, each individual‘s ability. In a medical care 
facility, physicians, nurses, support staff, etc., have their own specific duties that they need to 
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perform. In this particular setting, whilst the physicians are aware of the medical procedures that 
are required, the technicians‘ are the experts at operating the electro-medical equipment (for 
example), anesthetists to perform the anesthesia before operating procedures. For such an 
occasion, team situation models would allow the team members to be able to develop implicit 
coordination, benefiting to the health services provided. This was confirmed by different 
interviewees who stated that in the OR the team is cohesive, everyone knows what their role is, 
and the main focus is on the welfare of the patient. 
 As mentioned before, there are different types of organizations, of which the ‗hospital‘ is 
a special case. Due to the different characteristics of the hospital‘s operations, including the 
segregation of different skills, professions, and specialties, different types of management 
techniques are required. Thus, the administration of a hospital is a very complex task where the 
coordination effort between all hospital‘s stakeholders plays a key role. Yet, the manner in which 
different actors interact is also decided and defined by the way decisions are made/taken in the 
hospital. The two major segregation between decision making configurations that an institution 
can be organized are the centralization or decentralization of decision making. Each one of these 
distinct decision making rationalities has specific benefits, but also deficiencies.    
 
 
DECENTRALIZATION AND CENTRALIZATION 
One of the major structural differences between organizations is the centralization and/or 
decentralization of their decision making and allocation of resources that result in distinct types 
of interactions between the stakeholders of the institution.   
There are different manners in which an organizational structure can be designed. 
Decentralization should be the chosen structure when fast responses are needed regarding new 
technological advances or environmental demands. In these cases, the information conduit is 
from lower to higher hierarchies, argues Aoki (1986). At the same time, centralization has its 





In the hospital under study, the ES scheduling planning is decentralized. The following is 
a description of the process: a patient comes for a consultation, and after the required medical 
examinations are done, the surgeon proposes surgery to the patient. For simplicity sake, it is 
assumed that the patient wants and accepts the surgery. A future date is proposed for the surgery, 
and the surgery is ‗booked‘; the unit secretary or unit administrator is responsible for contacting 
the patient before he is admitted to the hospital for the surgery. The nurses are responsible for 
preparing the patient for his surgery, taking into consideration the recommendations of the 
surgeon; these recommendations are available for review in the patient‘s file. The patient is 
admitted to the hospital, most of the time, the same day that the surgery takes place. And, the 
patient undergoes surgery. 
Some of the elements that complicate the situation include: 
1. The proposal for surgery by the surgeon can also happen when the patient is admitted and 
present in the hospital; yet, the surgery is still elective, i.e. it will take place at a future date. In 
this case, the patient will go home (if he is able to), and he will be re-admitted to the hospital 
before the surgery.  
2. The booking of the surgery for a specific unit needs to be approved by the Chief of the unit, 
which is requesting specific OR times for his unit. The time allocated to each specific unit is 
provided by the Chief of Surgery, the one responsible for all the surgeries and surgical units in 
the entire hospital. One can easily assume that all Chiefs would like to secure as much OR time 
as possible for their own units. Moreover, each surgeon would like to have as many surgeries as 
possible, as he is remunerated by how many surgeries he performs. 
3. The surgical administrator of a specific unit is responsible for managing the specific unit‘s 
surgical schedule, making sure that all surgeons have, in certain cases, proportional OR time. 
However, the proportional OR time rule for surgeons is not applied in all the units as there are 
other methods to allocate OR time (seniority, longer waiting list, etc.). 
4. In most cases, the Chief of the unit, which is the administrator is a surgeon. Therefore, he has 
two hats to wear: surgeon and administrator. 
5. The master schedule of surgeries is provided by the administrator at the Chief of Surgery 
level. In certain cases and situations, any interference with the proposed elective master schedule 
at a later date after it is accepted, needs to be approved by the Chief of Surgery. The 
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administrator of the master schedule of surgeries is considered to be central as he needs to ensure 
that the interaction between different units and different surgeons must come together in the 
Master Schedule. 
The reason why this system is considered decentralized is that decisions are taken at the 
surgeons‘ level, and it is the surgeons who decide when patients should have their surgeries. This 
is originally done as a time-frame is needed when the surgery is required. It must be noted that 
some patients who arrive at a later date may receive their surgeries before other patients who are 
already on the waiting list and have already waited. All this does not diminish the surgeons‘ 
authority as they are the experts in their profession and they can take decisions disregarding 
other surgeons and other units; hence, having a decentralized decision approach. 
Burton and Obel (1998), considering contingency theory, are of the view that 
interdependence between groups should be minimized, in order to provide autonomy to the 
respective departments and sub-divisions. Doing so enables the company to break-down tasks 
and issues into smaller problems, making it easier to deal with. The same approach is utilized 
today in project management projects. This methodology ensures that less information is 
required to solve a problem (Galbraith, 1973). Furthermore, Burton and Obel (1998) state that 
top management is rarely involved in the day-to-day operational problems of the organization. 
This is a consequence of a decentralization strategy (Duncan, 1979). In particular, a divisional 
layout improves response-rates and flexibility within a company, and allows for organizations to 
specifically target consumer/customer requirements. However, such a divisional structure 
demands high level of coordination between the sub-sections, and also a method to control 
individuals in order for them to perform appropriately.  
Furthermore, one aspect that does not help the current situation and increases 
decentralization is the fact that the hospital is a federal system where the units form the 
federation and they have autonomy and discretion regarding the operations within their own 
units. It is the patient who is the force behind the coordination. Rational bureaucracy brings some 
formalization and standardization, yet these are only mechanisms of medical coordination.  
Due to the actual decentralization processes and principles of the hospital, the work is 
performed in silos. This means that units do not actually interact with each other, and surgeons 
within the same unit have the same approach. The ‗coming together‘ is done by the administrator 
when he combines the actual schedule, either for the unit or for the hospital. It is the Master 
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Blau and Schoenherr (1971), Child (1973) and Pugh et al. (1969a) showed that there is a 
negative relationship between an organization‘s size and scope and the centralization of decision 
making. Hospitals today have a decentralized structure, and decisions are taken at the unit level. 
This is to be expected as there is a high degree of specialization. However, decentralization can 
lead to inefficiencies. The debate between centralization and decentralization is long standing. 
One argument is that centralization helps to manage high volumes of work and contributes to 
improved results, while, as McKee and Healy (2000, p. 805) put it, allowing the hospital to 
―achieve economies of scale‖. This is well researched by Aletras et al. (1997) that suggest the 
optimal size of beds in a hospital is to be between 200 and 400. However, McKee and Healy 
(2000, p. 805) make the counter argument that decentralization ―improves population access and 
reduces inequalities‖. Zabojnik (2002, p. 2) summarizes the trade-off between the two 
management philosophies as follows: ―on the one hand, delegation leads to a better utilization of 
information scattered throughout the lower levels of the firm‘s hierarchy; on the other hand, it 
entails a loss of control for the upper-level managers.‖  Quite interestingly, it has been shown 
that ―task predictability has a positive effect on centralization of policy decision but a negative 
effect of the centralization of routine decisions‖ (Comstock and Scott 1977, p. 198). These 
findings support those of Reeves and Woodward‘s (1970) by suggesting that if a task is more 
predictable and repeated, the higher the chance to separate policy making and 
decisions/execution. 
At the highest level within the hospital, resources are in fact centralized. However, once 
they are distributed to the individual units, representing the decentralization of resources, the 
units do not need to have a high degree of interaction between them.  
Another potential response to these situations, conflicts and tensions might be to 
centralize the information system. This would mean the centralization of some part of the 
information regarding the elective surgeries, more specifically, the centralization of the planning 
of surgeries at the unit level and at the hospital level. This solution ensures that some of the 
difficulties with the decentralized planning are overcome.  
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For example, the interaction between staff of different units would be reduced. All the 
surgeons, depending on the rules built in this subjective system, could have a fair allocation 
of OR time. The unit which would have the most surgeries would be allocated more OR time. 
This system and the manner in which it would allocate surgeries could be built-in, depending on 
the policies that the units and hospital deem necessary and appropriate. Building on the example 
of the allocation of OR time, colon cancer surgeries must be performed in less than 28 days 
(requirement imposed by the provincial government). The system could make the necessary 
calculations and adjustments required to ensure that all these surgeries are performed in the time 
allocated. The centralized system could be able to adjust the patients‘ needs, if the patients‘ 
surgery is becoming more urgent. 
In the current decentralized system, there are problems where actors interact and are 
forced to apply different power strategies in order to secure resources for their own unit or for 
themselves. Therefore, a new system is proposed: centralization of decision regarding the 
scheduling planning of elective surgeries. The proposed computer schedule and model is an 
impersonal system where no one individual makes any scheduling allocation decision, and where 
surgeons only place the patients‘ characteristics in the system; these may include criticality, 
urgency and maximum possible waiting time, among others. Some interviewees do find this 
approach helpful, yet there is no consensus with the surgeons regarding this aspect. 
Centralization provides different responsibilities including assessing rewards, budgeting, 
forecasting, and decision making. The capacity to process information is strongly linked with 
centralization/decentralization: the larger the information amount, the larger the decision-making 
mechanism, and the greater the decentralization in most organizations (Burton and Obel, 1998). 
Centralizing the information, and in certain cases, centralizing decisions and procedures would 
be an appropriate means to overcome, or at least to avoid, some of the pitfalls of 
decentralization. 
For Kingston (1983, p. 1162), ―organizational structure depends on clearly defined 
boundaries, that is to say, assumptions about the meaning of key concepts, the proper division of 
work and the legitimate exercise of power.‖ Key notions of rank and proper division of work are 
present for medical purposes. There are directly and specifically clearly defined boundaries (the 
doctor is supposed to do X, the nurse is supposed to do Y). The higher administration provides 
specific guidelines to the units, and the information is dispersed from top to bottom. Yet, there 
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are side interactions between units, surgeons and administrators that offer a balancing 
mechanism when disparities arise. The side-transfers have an important role in ensuring the 
maximal use of resources. 
Even though structure is important in the overall institutional layout, and the management 
and coordination efforts are made to ensure that all the stakeholders are on the same page, 
resources is one of the key driving forces that underline the basic reasons for the specific type of 
allocation: decentralized or centralized. Without the proper resources, a hospital cannot function. 
Furthermore, the available resources must respond exactly to what is required by the 
stakeholders. Organizations cannot survive if they do not respond directly to what is asked from 
them. This idea brings into context contingency theory which stipulates that an organization must 
respond to the demands of the environment, and ensuring that the resources available are 
properly managed in such a way that the outputs of the hospital do respond to the demands of the 
environment. The situation and analysis of the hospital become even more intricate what the 
latter is considered an open-system that is able (and must) adapt to what is asked from it. 
 
Contingency theory 
Bourgeois (1984, p. 590) maintains that contingency models provide a simple theoretical 
solution that is supported by data because the former were developed on structure/structural 
correlational analysis. The pioneers of contingency theory were Bruns and Stalker (1961), 
Lawrence and Lorsh (1973), and Woodward (1965). Even today, the works of Galbraith (1973) 
and Mintzberg (1982) are still extremely relevant to this conceptual framework. Furthermore, the 
research proposed by Daft (1991), Duncan (1979), Nadler and Tushman (1988) and Nadler et al. 
(1979) also significantly contributed to enhancing the understanding of this particular field. The 
research carried out by Burton and Obel (1998) and Burton et al. (2000) helps to expand upon 
the original concepts by providing a larger model that incorporates previous authors‘ work.  
Due to the development of organizations and a very intricate environment, open-systems 
perspectives were taken in consideration. Kast and Rosenzweig (1974) believe that contingency 
theorists do have a ―one best way‖ of the organizational structure setup that has the ‗best fit‘ 
(Aldrich, 1975); yet, these are dependent on the different circumstances imposed by the 
environment. The ‗fit‘ is defined by Donaldson (2001, p. 7) as a match ―between the 
organization structure and contingency factors that has a positive effect on performance.‖ As 
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Luthans and Stewart (1977, p. 183) put it, ―the contingency approach is defined as identifying 
and developing functional relationships between environmental, management and performance 
variables.‖ 
Contingency theory, as well as agency theory, refers to different methods of information 
administration (Chandler, 1962; Galbraith, 1973; Lawrence and Lorsch, 1967): the information is 
asymmetrically dispersed throughout the organization (Eisenhardt, 1989). At the same time, the 
information enables potential efficiencies and specific organizational forms are chosen over 
others (Galbraith, 1973). However, there are certain differences between the two theories. For 
contingency theorists, the main focus is with the ―optimal structure of reporting relationships and 
decision making responsibilities‖ (Eisenhardt 1989, p. 63). Agency theory is concerned with the 
outcome of the reporting and decision making. For the current research, contingency theory 
provides the best coordination mechanism.   
Luthans and Stewart (1977) 
divide the different variables in two 




secondary variables (situation, 
organization, performance criteria). 
The system performance is the 
aggregated component that measures 
the fitness of the system. The authors 
provide a clear description of the interactions between all the variables, replicated in Figure 2.  
In the context of contingency theory, the goals of the organization are set by the different 
stakeholders taking in consideration both the internal and external environment of the 
organization as well as the resource constraints (Luthans and Stewart, 1977). The environment in 
which an organization operates is extremely important as it determines its structural setup 
described by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967). The context in this view considers the organizational 
structure or the organization, including it hierarchy, internal and external rules and regulations. 
Thus, contingency theory ―regards the design of an effective organization as necessarily having 
 
Figure 2: A summary of the variables and 
relationships in a contingency model* 





to be adapted to cope with the ‗contingencies‘ which derive from the circumstances of 
environment, technology, scale, resources and other factors‖ (Child 1973a, p. 237). Once again, 
the constraints imposed by the circumstances of an organization refer and reflect the variability, 
validity and value of any organizational outcome. These aspects are the ones that demand a 
reaction from the institution in order to adapt and provide the ‗best fit‘ response that would 
ensure a more efficient outcome. In order to differentiate between the constraints, Ranson et al. 
(1980) distinguish between the organizational characteristics and the environmental ones. One 
important element that links the latter is the resources utilized. On one hand, they are provided 
by the external environment, yet they are utilized by rules and guidelines internal to the 
organization. 
The structure of an institution needs to be modeled according to the particular set of 
requirements, either internal or external. Organizational structure needs to be adopted first, and 
then fine-tuned to serve the purpose most suited to its environment (Amblard et al., 1996). 
Companies need to constantly evolve and adjust according to the changes in the business 
environment; otherwise, they cannot survive in the long run. Although the structure of any 
organization is dependent upon the environment, it is important to note that the dependence is 
not just machine-like and deterministic in nature. The idea that a business is a closed system, and 
that organizational performance is only concerned with work procedures is out-dated in today‘s 
interdependent economical building blocks. The structure of a ‗good‘ organization not only 
depends upon the environment, but also on the goals that the organization desires to accomplish. 
According to Burton and Obel (1998), some structural parameters become increasingly 
significant, depending on the contingent features encountered by the organization and internal 
stability within a business corporation.  
Galbraith (1973) believes that there is no perfect structure, rather a structure that is better 
suited to the particular needs and requirements of an organization. Processing information is one 
of the most critical aspects of successful business operations (Galbraith, 1973). Nadler and 
Tushman (1988) also proposed a three-phase design to manage information within a company: 1. 
grouping individuals into different sections, or sub-units; 2. the coordination of the sub-units in 
order to achieve optimal performance; 3. managerial mechanisms that provide the rules and 
regulations of the operation itself, thus controlling the information flow and processing.   
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Tangentially, Nadler and Tushman (1988) also incorporate in their design one of the most 
important aspects of coordination, besides Galbraith‘s (1973) ability to share and process 
information: resources. As mentioned previously, resources are one of the driving mechanisms of 
the hospital. Without access to the proper resources, surgeries do not get scheduled, and worse, 
they get canceled because of lack in a timely manner to the resources needed. Furthermore, the 
manner in which resources are distributed could be through a centralized or decentralized 
decision, aspect previously argued.  
Resources that are present and available to the staff are also important, and they may not 
be only physical in nature, but also non-physical, such as alliances, unions, relationships. 
Resource dependency theory can provide some of the frameworks employed in hospitals and can 
answer some of the reasons why certain allegiances between units at the medical staff level are 
formed. Yet, from a bird‘s-eye-view, the core values of dependency theory are not applicable 
within the context of a hospital, i.e. the interaction between the different units or individuals. The 
reason is that the hospital must ensure its legitimacy to its internal and external constituents; 
therefore, it cannot undermine one department to the benefit of another. All departments have the 
same hospital goals and provide the same hospital services: medical care to patients.  
Bamford and Griffin (2008, p. 215) conducted a study on eight operational teams in a UK 
National Health Service hospital by a combination of survey and group discussions. In 
conducting their research on human resource management within the operational team-work of 
healthcare workers, they found that the composition of a team had little operational description. 
In other words, what really led to effective team-work was not an organizational support for 
team-working or the establishment of multi-disciplinary teams, but rather other factors, such as: 
leadership skills, frequent team meetings, and a climate of trust and openness. It is argued that 
these are part of the non-physical resources needed. 
Bamford and Griffin (2008) further emphasize that what they have learned from the 
research is a result of specific circumstances in one UK NHS Trust, and these are relevant for the 
operational management of healthcare teams in the UK Public Sector. They have found six 
crucial messages, provided in Appendix A. In the same Appendix A, a figure shows the 
operational team-work inputs, processes and outputs that deliver team effectiveness. Some can 
be characterized as physical resources and others as non-physical ones. 
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Lega and DePietro (2005, p. 268-269) examine how resource integration is accomplished 
through resource pooling. Beds, operating rooms, equipment, nursing staff are allocated to a unit 
and then are shared between all functional specialties. For example, if beds and ORs are 
scheduled for a single specialty and specialists, but are under-utilized, the Chief of the unit can 
reassign them to other specialties that have a waiting list. Another point is that utilization caused 
by unplanned events such as emergencies due to aggravation of the patient can be decided by the 
head nurse of that unit. This also suggests that the nursing profession might have a decisive role 
in carrying responsibility for the patient`s medical needs, and ensuring that they are met 
(Mechanic and Aiken, 1982). Despite this aspect, the nurses‘ recognition occurred only recently. 
The doctor can assess, on a clinical perspective, if there is a need to admit a patient in a specific 
ward, but he lacks the assessment if that ward will provide enough care to the patient, because of 
its staffing level, ward maintenance problems and others (Campbell, 1980). From a managerial 
point of view, it is clear that admitting someone is a task for the wards nursing manager. This is 
especially true if the ward consists of more than one specialty. The wards with shared ORs and 
equipment should try to maximize coordination of the allocation of fixed or ―leading‖ resources 
(Vissers, 1998), which would result in an increase of their flexibility, having a lean pull-system.  
The author differentiates ―leading‖ resources, such as OR capacity, from the ―following‖ 
resources, such as beds and nursing staff. These are examples where an administration decision 
is ‗readjusted‘ in the front lines. 
Lega and DePietro (2005) notice how the allocation and management of these resources 
are performed through an interdependent process. This is done by the unit administrator, who is 
appointed by the hospitals top management, with the consensus of the unit chair and/or by the 
head nurse. Units generally have at their discretion how to proceed, as long as they are 
profitable/efficient; it is for this reason that the authors claim that clinical governance is still in 
its ―embryonic stage‖. Giving an example of Mount Sinai Hospital in New York, the researchers 
argue that hospitals should evolve toward a more care-focused approach, by reorganizing 
departments, based on patient grouping and multidisciplinary teams. Lega and DePietro (2005, p. 
273) also advocate ―engagement of professionals through reinforcement of organizational 
mechanisms, with the aim of a better alignment of their interests with organizational goals‖ as 
another important objective.  
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The bureaucratic realm cannot be avoided in any institution. For any hospital in Canada, 
having a bureaucratic rational as the cement between the different units and actors is the 
cornerstone of this specific organization. This cement would be the glue that keeps everything in 
place and that links all the aspects, actors, and interactions found in a hospital. Decisions can be 
made in a centralized or decentralized manner, resources allocated through any method, 
administration can coordinate under any auspices; yet, all has to go through a/the bureaucratic 




Reay and Hinings (2005) have the same direction as Martin (1980, p. 68) that provides 
certain potential dangers due to the characteristics of the hospital environment because there is ―a 
struggle between opposing forces‖ and specific strategies and tactics need to be employed. One 
is required to understand how a hospital works, the strategic and tactical politics that are present 
in it, and how these politics apply to and for the administrative and medical levels of the 
hierarchy. This idea was present in all of the interviews performed with the surgeons, as all of 
them would want more OR time. The hospital is a hierarchical organization. Martin (1980) 
explains very well the dual authority/authoritarian system present in any hospital: the clinical 
hierarchy formed by the medical staff, and the administration hierarchy, which most of the time 
is not composed by medical staff. The previously mentioned struggle is between these systems, 
hierarchies, and members. Moreover, the medical staff sees the administrative staff as intruders, 
and tension is created between the two parties. Building on Martin (1980) opposing factors and 
struggles, Young and Saltman (1985) have the exact same perspective on the matter, and this is 
why centralization (the removal of power in certain instances) is recommended. 
The present research does not challenge bureaucracy; the former is just an extension of 
the latter, in a very specific context, having the same rational as Friedson (1978, p. 982) who 
states that ―the issue of interest, however, is not bureaucratization in and of itself as an ideal 
model, but rather the particular qualities it will assume in reality.‖ The main idea of bureaucracy, 
succinctly put, is to have human and non-human resources, thus creating a social context, and a 
management method that ensures the best utilization level for the resources. This may not be the 
case as social actors may utilize the resources in an inefficient manner. The last point aims at 
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having trained personnel to use the resources, and the ‗consumption‘ of the resources is done in 
an effective and efficient manner. Furthermore, many bureaucracies do not take in consideration 
this aspect, meaning that they are not fully opened to different viewpoints, trying to adapt to the 
environment, and implement new methods of doing business.  
The system does work to a certain degree, and ―organizations do some of the basic things 
they do because they must – or else!‖ (Thompsons 1967, p. 1). However, there might be better 
ways to undertake activities in the hospital; it is this ‗if it works, do not meddle with it‘ mentality 
that is challenged in the current research. 
Lega and DePietro (2005, p. 263) provide some ―needs [that] reinforced the adoption of a 
functional specialties based design‖:  
 
- there exists the need to separate the areas governed by different physicians in the same 
hospital  or across different hospitals;  
- distribution of medical work and the ways doctors are organized is based on individuals 
professional interests, finances, rivalries and career opportunities, rather than by 
analyzing the needs of the patients;  
- requirement of maintaining viable control, because managing and supervising is a 
challenge. 
 
Bucher and Stelling (1969, p. 13) clarify the core nature of a bureaucracy that is typically 
understood as ―characterized by a hierarchical chain of command, clearly defined duties and 
obligations associated with each office, with goals and procedures determined at the top and 
conveyed down the chain of command-a type of system which would discourage autonomy and 
innovation among the ranks.‖  
For the purposes of this analysis, there are two types of bureaucracies: general – 
considering the forefather of bureaucracy, Weber and his contributions to this important topic; 
the professional bureaucracy, which cannot directly be qualified using Weber‘s bureaucratic 
specifications. The professional bureaucracy is important as in the hospital, there are different 
professions that perform very specialized tasks, and the members of these groups can have a lot 
of influence on the system in general. 
For these reasons, after describing Weber and the Weberian bureaucracy, including 
aspects of the different types of conflicts and power statuses, the professional bureaucracy is 
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introduced with its own take on the hospital‘s interactions and the role of the administrator is 
such a system. 
 
Weber and bureaucracy 
Weber‘s bureaucracy can be described and defined by the following elements (Blau and 
Scott, 1962; Engel, 1969; Litwak, 1961): impersonal social relations, employment (and 
advancement) based on merit and competition, obligations imbedded in the position (not in the 
individual), a hierarchical structure of authority (rooted in the positions) where power is 
centralized at the top, dichotomy of administrative and policy positions, rules and regulation of 
behavior and official action, and, most importantly, division of labor, i.e. specialization.   
However, there are certain elements of Weber‘s classification of bureaucracy that cannot 
be applied to the healthcare. McKee (1970, p. 25) describes the bureaucratic environment of the 
hospital and adds an interesting note: ―The modem hospital is a highly stratified and complex 
organization. It has become an extremely bureaucratized establishment with a multitudinous 
division of labor, formal channels of communication, exacting regulations, and yet, for a 
bureaucracy, a somewhat confused hierarchy of authority.‖ The confusion of authority is only 
partially to blame. The interactions 
and social strata have also their 
influence to the complications.  
Table 3 is adjusted from 
Weinman et al. (1979, p. 32), 
building on previous research by 
Pugh et al. (1968, 1969a, 1969b) 
and Pugh and Pheysey (1968), and 
provides six hypothetical 
dimensions of structure which are 
present in any organization, to 
different degrees. The distinction 
between bureaucratic centralization 
and the proposed centralization of 
Dimension Understanding  
Specialization division of labor within the 
organization and involving two 
aspects: the number of specialists, 
and the degree of role specialization 
Standardization number of types of procedures and the 
rules and policies developed to guide the 
activities of the organization 
Formalization extent to which procedures (and 
communication) in an organization 
are performed (written) 
Centralization locus of authority to make decisions 
affecting the organization 
Configuration system of relationships determined by the 
top-down/bottom-up authority, and their 
respective responsibility 
Traditionalism degree to which the organization is guided 
by customs rather than formal rules and 
written procedures 
 
Table 3: Six hypothetical dimensions of structure* 
*Adjusted from Weinman et al. (1979, p. 32) 
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this research needs to be made: the latter only concerns a very specific aspect of the organization 
--- the planning (scheduling) of elective surgeries.  
Contingency theory can explain partly why and how individuals and/or groups fall to 
different degrees into these dimensions. It is also through the lens of the same theory that 
uniform and non-uniform events can be rationalized to coexist in a healthcare institution.  
For Weber, society and organizations are segregated into value-spheres that are 
competing; each sphere has its own obligations, norms and values (Townley 2002, p. 164). 
Weber‘s impersonal bureaucracy sustains, and it is very well adapted to, a high level of uniform 
events. Litwak (1961, p. 179) believes that individuals are ―faced with non-uniform events which 
are not clearly covered by rules are insecure.‖ Once again, due to lack of security, status and 
position, tensions between actors arise. Even if it is implicitly, Weber maintains that the 
traditional areas of knowledge have a stronger presence in the organizations contrasted with 
social skills. It is this social skill boundary that requires some of the borders to be addressed and 
rearranged in order to reduce the stress.  
It is easy to see that tensions and conflicts might arise as a result of interactions between 
different stakeholders that maintain different structural dimensions. Bucher and Stelling‘s (1969) 
chain of command also can contribute to a tense atmosphere in the organization. Therefore, a 
proper understanding of struggles that different stakeholders have, taking in consideration the 




Reay and Hinings‘ (2005) observations are similar with those found by DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) that organizations are a battlefield where skirmish battles and clashes take place 
and where different sources of power are used via different tactics. Each actor has their own 
power sources, and thus, their own tactics. Hewett et al. (2009, p. 1733), building on previous 
research, state that ―team conflict is often attributed to socio-cultural factors, status and power 
structures, rigid professional boundaries, differing views on collaboration, desire for professional 
autonomy, the complex and pressing nature of work, and desire to avoid or suppress conflict.‖ 
Therefore, there are specific reasons why such conflicts exist. For someone who does not know 
how the general hospital works from an administrative/interaction point of view, the authors‘ 
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statement may be contradictory to the common belief that the hospital is a ‗well-oiled machine‘ 
where the entire system is there for the betterment of the patient.  
According to Wilson (1963), relationships amongst staff and workers are defined by 
unclear authority patterns, competition, competence and prestige. The physician is thought of as 
the individual least affected by hierarchical control, due to enhanced skill, talent and status. 
However, Eakin (1984) highlights a key element in regards to managing the staff, after 
conducting interviews with the administrative personnel of healthcare institutions. According to 
the administrators, the problem in dealing with physicians arises from the doctors‘ financial 
independence, difference in status between administrator and physician, and their claims for 
complete autonomy over their work. For the administrators, interacting with physicians is one of 
most complicated aspect of their job.    
McKee (1970) believes that two separate authoritative entities exist within the system. 
From the operational side, the administrative staff goals are to ‗maintain‘ the plant, financial 
affairs and non-medical needs of the patients. On the other hand, the physicians are tasked with 
providing the medical care services. According to Scott and Volkart (1966, Part 3), the 
distinction amongst the specific functions of the two parties is hazy in some places, which often 
results in strained relations. Administration laments the physicians‘ interference in the 
administrative work, and the clinicians take offense by the administration‘s interference in 
medical procedures. The most common area of conflict arises from the differences in opinion of 
the physician‘s definition of an emergency case, in comparison to keeping to a time table set-
forth by the management.  
Furthermore, McKee (1988) collected data on the relationship between managers and 
doctors in a psychiatric hospital, revealing that the conflict between consultant psychiatrists and 
general managers is particularly acute and decision making becomes additionally politicized. The 
backdrop of the severe conflict is due to the difference in opinion in terms of the seriousness of 
the illness, methodology of treating the patient, objectives, controlling the outcomes and motives 
of each segment. This conflict is even more enhanced due to the advent of cost-effective business 
practices. To add, McKee (1988, p. 312) points out that in this case, ―the managers were more 
influenced by their day to day experience of the clinicians which were described as less than 
innovative or supportive of change.‖ 
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Clinicians are often accused by the administrators to hide behind autonomy and clinical 
freedom, when times call to make unpalatable decisions, concerning patient‘s medical care. 
Their continued efforts to rebel and refusal to adopt the policy of the managers are considered to 
be a hindrance in hospital administration, eventually effecting the manager‘s success in running 
and organizing the healthcare institution (McKee, 1988).  
 It is not surprising that the physicians and administrators are often skeptical, with both 
parties keeping negative perceptions of each other (McKee, 1988). On one hand, physicians view 
the managers as careerist, individualistic in nature, looking only to optimize profits and bonuses; 
the managers think of doctors as selfish, greedy and too one-dimensional. Yet, McKee (1988) 
also believes that it is the administrator‘s job to bridge the communication gaps with the 
physicians in order to reduce the impact of the political environment.  
Most of the time, managers are focused on achieving short term objectives, as well as 
catering for the day-to-day tasks, and so the attention towards the diplomatic aspects of the job 
are often overlooked. Hence, administrators‘ success is strongly linked to cultivating positive 
interactions with the physicians, as they are the ones who have the ability, vision and expertise to 
claim a majority stake in the state of affairs of the healthcare system. Proactive management of 
the aforementioned processes needs to be evaluated, in order to implement a policy change and 
have proper working relations (McKee, 1988).  
According to Ranson et al. (1980), individuals and groups of an organization have power 
because they have command over resources. Allocation of these resources gives them power to 
define outcomes and to ―recreate rules, positions and budgetary allocations which ensure the 
reproduction of those bases‖ (Greenwood et al., 1977; Ranson et al. 1980, p. 8). Structural 
framework is a key tool which groups use to preserve and sustain their power in organizations, 
and groups work hard to create structures that would become institutionalized. Ranson et al. 
(1980, p. 8) realize that ―the operation of the power system‖ is connected with the ―strategic 
decision making‖ (Child, 1972.), and by that, to the conflicts of interests and principles that are 
underlying a specific activity. In this case, power is understood processually: issues occur, 
information is submitted, and ―decision are made about roles, rules and authority relations‖ 
(Ranson et al.1980, p. 8). 
DiTomaso et al. (2007, p. 475), similar to Sachdev and Bourhis (1991), define power as 
―access to and control over‖ resources that are limited. Even though the authors‘ focus is solely 
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on the personnel, the people who actually do the work, they do incorporate the idea of class and 
control of certain classes over others. Young and Saltman (1985, p. 24) apply this definition in 
the context of a health center and provide the presupposed gaps in the ‗standard‘ power 
infrastructure; they look at ―power as a determinant of organizational decisions [that] exists on 
three different but highly interrelated levels: 1. within a given medical specialty; 2. between 
various medical specialties; 3. among different occupational groups within the hospital.‖ This 
description mimics the current power struggles and tensions between the various factions in the 
Montreal region hospitals. The scuffle between levels is also very well described by Wilson 
(1963, p. 72): ―these are, first, the diffusion of authority, and, second, the excruciating struggle 
for occupational prestige.‖ Due to the differences in prestige and authority, tensions are 
developed. These tensions are also nourished by the fact that members of the different groups 
want to accomplish either goals for personal benefit or goals that support the group to which they 
belong. 
 
The professional bureaucracy  
The standard bureaucratic structure consists of formalization, decentralization, vertical 
span and specialization. Bureaucracies can be organized according to several different structural 
models. Each structure experiences different pressures and each structure has particular contexts 
to which it is best suited. In the hospital setting, professional bureaucracies often 
proliferate. Medical professional bureaucracies present a unique set of complexities to the 
efficient functioning of the bureaucracies because of the exigent nature of the medical 
profession. Most of the time there are difficulties in the application of bureaucratic theory to the 
medical professional content. If, as Light and Levine (1988, p. 12) suggest, professionals are 
largely defined by their autonomy, and ―bureaucracies have a way of generating their own 
sources of power through regulations and hierarchy‖, how is that conflict resolved? 
Weber (1968) also portrays very important elements of the professionalism order (Carr-
Saunders and Wilson, 1933; Scull, 1979), by stating that ―guilds are a form of closed order 
which pursues quality, prestige, and profit to the mutual benefit of its members‖ (Light and 
Levine 1988, p. 21). It is through this perspective that physicians started to unite into a 
professional order.  
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Bucher and Stelling (1969, p. 3) argue that there are limits to applying bureaucratic 
theory to the analysis of professional organizations because ―professionals create their own 
distinctive social organization within a larger organization‖, and politics, negotiations and 
alliances characterize these organizations. The authors also stipulate that tensions could arise 
between the different professionals and administrative rationales in any organization. In addition, 
the professional‘s relationship to authority as formative of self-definition represents a 
complication in the chain of command that is typically existent within a well-functioning 
bureaucracy. Professionals, as Bunderson et al. (2000, p. 386-387) define them are ―groups of 
individuals who are trained to perform a specific type of work whose identity is at least partly 
drawn from that work and who share norms and values which apply to but extend beyond work-
related matters‖ (Brown and Duguid, 1991; Trice, 1993). Bucher and Stelling (1969, p. 13) 
provide a more detailed description of the professional as ―a person who derives his aims and 
methods from a professional body, works independently, and who commands the privilege to 
autonomously determine what should be done and how it should be done.‖ In the context of 
these individuals, where communities are formed by a professional and technical workforce (Van 
Maanen and Barley, 1984), whose social groups, values and identities grow at least to some 
extent out of work, and whose work has been treasured by the definition of medical 
professionalization, decisions that should be made with administrative rational (Van Maanen and 
Barley, 1984) are influenced by professional thinking. Furthermore, Heydebrand (1973) 
maintains that professional organizations ―tend to predominate under complex task structures‖.  
Freidson and Rhea (1963, p. 119) argued that the professionals‘ autonomy within an 
organization is contrary to Weber‘s rational-legal bureaucratic model. Satow (1975) also believes 
that the professionals will follow, hold and defend the guild norms (rules) when (and if) these are 
divergent with the administrative rules. In the same train of thought, Bucher and Stelling (1969) 
also do not consider that the Weberian bureaucracy matches the organization desired by the 
professional cohorts. In their study, they realized that a ‗new‘ organization is required, one that 
combines the guild mentality with bureaucracy, more precisely, the type of organization that 
results from the interaction of bureaucracy and professional mentality. In the context of a 
hospital, professionals often have to take on administrative tasks that are part and parcel of an 
efficiently operating organization. The autonomy of the professional can come into conflict with 
administrative tasks that require administrative, rather than professional thinking.   
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As organizations and their structures are not similar and ‗one-size fits all‘ approach is 
erroneous, the application of bureaucratic elements must take in consideration the nature of the 
organization, the environment and the members of that organization. Therefore, there needs to be 
a strict distinction between the professional and administrative groups as each one of them has 
different goals and objectives. Furthermore, the interactions within and between these groups are 
very different, resulting in conflicts.  
An important issue in the professional literature is the impact that bureaucracy has on the 
professionals. However, the latter also affect and influence different strata of bureaucracies.  
Therefore, causality is in question: professionals affect bureaucracy or vice-versa? To this, Engel 
(1969, p. 30) adds that the administration sectors restrict professionals activities and causes the 
latter to be dependent on the organization: ―his [the professional] association with a bureaucratic 
organization could therefore prevent the professional from fulfilling a fundamental requisite of 
professional behavior – serving the best interests of his clients.‖  
By contrast, unlike physicians whereby the locus of power is in constant flux, Comstock 
and Scott (1977, p. 199) observe that nurses, do not behave ―as autonomous professionals 
demanding the privilege of exercising individual discretion, as physicians are likely to do 
(Freidson, 1970)‖; they work within the hospital‘s administrative structures ―in a heteronomous 
professional arrangement‖ (Comstock and Scott 1977, p. 199) as they lack a ‗power-base‘ 
similar to physicians (Etzioni, 1969; Hall, 1968; Scott, 1965). The authors discovered, contrary 
to their belief, that head nurses increased standardization and centralization of decision making. 
In contrast to physicians, nurses‘ power is based ―on organizational position‖ rather than on 
―individual expertise‖. Comstock and Scott (1977, p. 199) realize that the nurses use bureaucratic 
controls and constrains to govern ―the behavior of subordinate workers‖ (Heydebrand, 1973). As 
head nurses are the ones responsible for wards from all aspects – supervision, coordination and 
control of nurses and orderlies – they centralized the decision making and enforce strict 
procedures that govern the activity of the wards. Nurses delegate, but this does not mean that 
they are deferring their expertise. However, transferring authority, i.e. delegating, is sometimes a 
root of negotiations and conflicts. Mauksch (1973, p. 825) argues that the title of the task‘s 
performer invokes certain assumptions for responsibility of the task‘s results. Professionals are 
not to be confused with professional tasks. He points out that the ―the professionally performed 
task does not preclude delegated activity‖, and as such, the successful carrying out of the task 
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itself, whose goal is ―the reduction of the client‘s assessed problems,‖ should supersede the 
assumption of its success because it is performed by a titled professional (Mauksch 1973, p. 825-
826).  
Nonetheless, the importance of title is difficult to challenge. Light and Levine (1988) 
point out that the most influential source of professional power comes from a widespread cultural 
predilection to hold medical professionals in high esteem. Although culture provides the ―most 
fundamental source of professional power‖, argued also by Barzun (1978), the shifting nature of 
culture and the finicky nature of trends, make the cultural source of power less easily identified 
or quantified (Light and Levine 1988, p. 12). This ‗supreme‘ authority of physicians is replicated 
through the culture of medicine, class hierarchy, and institutions (Navarro 1976, 1986; Waitzkin 
1983).  Physicians are deeply invested in this title carrying power particularly as the 
corporatization has affected the nature of the medical profession (Goldstein 1984; Relman 1985). 
Yet, autonomy over the work performed, an aspect argued by Freidson (1968), is a necessary 
element but not sufficient to provide dominance. A second element is the authority over someone 
else‘s work. The credibility of the professional title is paramount as the market becomes more 
competitive and as physicians begin to ―unbundle services from hospitals and turn their offices 
into capital-intensive ambulatory centers for diagnosis and treatment‖ (Light and Levine, 1988, 
p. 20). 
The medical profession has centralized its own authority by using ―state powers 
throughout its history to pursue its goals and feared state intervention as a threat to professional 
autonomy‖ (Light and Levine 1988, p. 23). Indeed, the valorization of professional thinking and 
the investiture in professional titles can be in direct conflict with the typical functioning of a 
hierarchical bureaucracy.   
In a professional bureaucracy in which standardization tends to be agreed upon and then 
imposed on the professional organization, the ―coordinating mechanism is the standardization of 
skills‖ (Mintzberg 1980, p. 333). Conflict arises within professional organizations when there is 
lack of agreement concerning ―professional values and interests‖ (Bucher and Stelling, 1969, p. 
8), where the first one is characterized by overlapping work spaces, and the second one refers to 
the influence of administrative policy. Because a professional organization relies on 
standardization of skills that are transferred in specific roles and tasks as defined outside of the 
organization, the power to determine policy cannot be pinpointed to a specific position. It is 
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dislocated and the ―balance of power shifts in response to different issues and as different 
persons and groups move through the organization‖ (Bucher and Stelling 1969, p. 11). As a 
result, debates and struggles over the locus of power occupy a great deal of time and energy in 
situations where there are multiple professionals with overlapping spheres of work.  
Professionals and the institution are closely connected to each other. Where the 
professional draws on autonomy as an essential defining feature, the institution relies on a level 
of standardization, agreed upon by the professional association outside of the hospital, to provide 
a predictable level of care. It is a semi-dependent relationship. As Light and Levine (1988) point 
out in their discussion of the corporatization of the hospital and the proletarization of the staff 
(McKinlay and Stoeckle, 1988), as the institutional authority grows, professional authority can 
be either extended or put under threat. The authors further remark that in the conditions whereby 
a professional is reduced to a proletarian role within a corporate structure, the professional will 
defer their autonomy in favor of the goals of the institution. Nonetheless, the source of the 
legitimization of the institution comes from the professionals themselves (Light and Levine 
1988, p. 19-20). As such, the professionals must maintain a fine line between deferring to the 
ideals of the institution and protecting the integrity of their professional status upon which the 
status of the hospital relies.  
Besides all the clinical and medical aspects that a hospital is involved in, the 
administrator is the person who is supposed to handle all administrative aspects of all the 
activities within the hospital. This also includes the coordination between the different 
stakeholders in such a manner in which all come together and are able to tend to a patient in the 
most proficient way. This task is one of the greatest challenges of the hospital as it is supposed to 
mend and bend in a very cohesive fashion all the actors and stakeholders‘ demands, concerns and 
goals, taking in consideration each social factor which affects and influences all those involved 
in the hospital.  
 
Differences in the triad actors 
The administrator not only serves as a power figure, but he also moderates and intervenes 
where necessary; in essence, his role is more of a manager of affairs rather than that of an 
executive. For McKee (1970, p. 29), the administrator is ―a true man for all seasons.‖ Using a 
previous definition of Vanderwarker (1967, p. 39), McKee (1970, p. 27) defines the hospital 
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administrator as ―he who must -be concerned with the institution as a whole, the activity it 
supports, the public face it presents, and the private activity with which it is occupied.‖  
Therefore, different levels of administration and coordination are required.  
The role of administrators has evolved over the years, allowing them the experience to 
make both financial and managerial decisions in such a way as to avoid side-effects. 
Furthermore, this also helped their ‗legitimization‘ vis-à-vis the medical profession, and their 
understanding of the different rationalities involved in the decision making processes concerning 
healthcare in general (Perrow, 1961). Consequently, the medical spectrum is captured under the 
command and control of administration.  
 There are different problems and dynamics present in the interaction between the 
administrator and physicians as articulated by other researchers. Eakin (1984, p. 222), through a 
small survey of the literature, states that there are three main reasons why there is discrepancies 
and difficulties for the administrator to ‗manage‘ the medical staff: status differences, 
physicians‘ claim to clinical autonomy, and the latter‘s ‗contractual‘ position with the hospital.  
According to Wilson (1963), the most simple and convenient manner to understand the 
social structure is to examine the interpersonal relationships and subsequent actions which are 
centered upon those particular nexuses. Problems with beliefs and attitudes, and issues with the 
social structure are the two foremost reasons why social and cultural aspects hinder effective 
team work (Peeples and Francis 1968). The natural tension which exists between the doctors and 
nurses is brought upon by the difference in skill, talent, learning, education, training, job 
requirements and attitudes towards the other party. Despite the significant dissimilarity among 
the two occupations, nursing staff assumes that the physicians are not only aware but also 
understanding of the scope and sophisticated aspects of their profession. Likewise, doctors 
believe that nurses are acutely aware of the needs of patients, and can appreciate the 
requirements of the job they have and can relate to the former.   
Peeples and Francis (1968) state that there is a need to target the area of breach amongst 
the doctors and nurses, which are caused by the differences in values, attitudes, beliefs. The main 
disparity is in their classes; while the doctors tend to come from higher classes of the societies, 
nurses typically belong to middle or lower-middle classes. Varying classes of origin can also 
have an impact on their dissimilar beliefs and attitudes, which constitute for different viewpoints 
about the general perception of medical and healthcare.   
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In the Income Breach section, Peeples and Francis (1968) showed that there is a big 
disparity of income between doctors and nurses, a key element in contributing towards social 
differences. Physicians typically spend 9-12 years for education after high school, which is a lot 
more than a 4 years degree the nurses hold. However, the overall time spent is 1/3
rd
 for nurses, 
on average, yet the income disparity is as high as 1/5
th
 of what the physicians earn. To further 
build on the same point, the difference in status assigned to doctors and nurses is directly linked 
to the occupational gap. Physicians enjoy the most esteemed position in society, whereas the 
nurses are low on the hierarchical ladder in society (Peeples and Francis, 1968), lower than is 
deemed necessary by their qualification and importance of their work. Hence, nurses often view 
the doctors enjoying a far greater prestigious life, and which can cause them to develop ‗status 
anemia‘. Relative inequality between doctors and nurses, when viewed from the perspective of 
an egalitarian society breeds many in-house conflicts, including issues regarding lack of 
motivation and enthusiasm on the nurses‘ part. This is also very closely related to the 
occupational identity struggle. 
According to Peeples and Francis (1968), the profession of nursing is being further 
demeaned by the additional sub-division of labor, women‘s status in healthcare, and rapid socio-
cultural changes. This is in fact, unfair to the entire profession, as the nurses‘ duties are 
complicated with the advances in technology, and they are not being given enough credit for 
their competent work. Nursing tasks can often be overlooked as routine and simple, requiring 
less specialized approach. On the other hand, the suggestions and involvement of doctors is 
thought of substantially more important, in the eyes of the patients.  
Expectations states theory describes how status formulates a power hierarchy, which is a 
contributing factor in status differences (Berger et al., 1998, Ridgeway, 1994). DiTomaso et al. 
(2007) also mention the importance of power groups within an organization, and relate it with 
expectation state theory. Status construction theory suggests a direct link among resources and 
competence – the assumption of this association means that those with higher status are more 
confident, and in a way, widen the status differential with the lower status group (Ridgeway, 







The research was performed at one major general hospital in the Montreal region which 
provided historical archival data of surgeries performed during a three year period. Furthermore, 
different interviews were performed with the surgeons, administrators, and OR nursing staff of 
the hospital. The interviews performed provide the details of what the OR scheduling procedures 
are and how they take place, as well as the interactions between different surgical units. 
As the (average) durations of surgeries differed between units, it was assumed that their 
planning methodology might be different. There were 12 interviews performed were with the 
staff of the 5 surgical units, out of a total of 11 surgical specialties of the entire hospital, which 
are: Cardio-Thoracic-Vascular (C.T.V.) surgical unit, Ear-Neck-Throat (E.N.T.) surgical unit, 
General surgery, Neuro-surgery, Ophthalmological surgery. The Cardio-Vascular surgical unit 
was combined with Thoracic surgical unit in this analysis due to the historical surgical 
information provided by the hospital, thus forming the Cardio-Thoracic-Vascular surgical unit. 
The two reasons why these 5 specific units were chosen is that the average surgical durations for 
each unit have a great variability, and that the number of surgeries performed by each unit is 
different. This provides good insight for the quantitative simulation analysis.  
The staff interviewed included Chiefs of units, surgeons, nurses, and administrators. It 
must be noted that the unit chiefs, even though they are surgeons themselves, have an 
administrator‘s role as well. Furthermore, interviews with OR nurses and booking department 
were also performed in order to provide a clear picture of the scheduling performed in this 
particular hospital as well as to understand the coordination efforts required to create the Master 
Surgical Schedule. There were a total of 5 hours and 22 minutes for the interviews that were 
transcribed in a total of 96 pages. The main questions asked are provided in Appendix C, 
segregated by the role of the interviewee. 
Table 4 provides the 
number of surgeons within the 
specific unit, the number of staff 
interviewed and the number of 
surgeries performed by each 
individual unit that is part of the  
Table 4: General characteristics of 5 surgical units 
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research. Table 5 shows the number identification 
of the interviewee as well as the position(s) he or 
she holds. More information cannot be provided for 
Table 5 in order to protect the confidentiality of the 
interviewees.  
There was only one interview with an OR 
nurse; this is due to the lack of time that OR nurses 
have outside the OR. Even though the interviewee 
has a high administrative position, enabling the 
nurse to be aware of potential tensions between OR 
nurses, surgeons and administrators, it is only just 
one perspective of these professionals and it is 
considered not representative. As additional 
inferences could not be extracted for the qualitative aspect of the research, the nurse‘s interview 
is not included in the analysis.   
The principal quantitative analyst of the hospital provided some of the initial contacts by 
introducing the researcher to some of the units. Emails were sent to the Chiefs of the units 
requesting an interview. At the interviews with the chiefs, the snowball sampling technique was 
used as the chiefs were asked if they recommended other surgeons within their units for the 
study; once the potential surgeons were identified, they were sent an email inviting them to the 
interview. The same procedure was used for the unit administrators. In all the first emails sent to 
the potential participant, the following documents were included: the lay summary of the study, 
the questions, and the information and consent form. The participants had the opportunity to 
choose the time and date of the interview.  
The interviews were open-ended in order to allow for more spontaneous responses, 
permitting the interviewees to provide their direct input and their perspectives into the subject 
matter.  
Open coding was used by analyzing each paragraph of the transcribed interviews. The 
interviews were performed to uncover 3 fundamental aspects: 1. an understanding of how the 
elective surgery schedule is created; 2. interactions between stakeholders and their 
characteristics; 3. how do stakeholders see a potential centralization of the elective surgery 
 




schedule. These were also the main categories that were used to identify different factors of the 
operations within a specific unit.  
The primary codes were larger in number in order to be as faithful to what the 
interviewees reported. Some of these codes were redundant, thus they were collapsed. The 
following step comprised in the interpretation of the codes, and provided the secondary 
categories codes, the overarching themes. Once the themes were developed, the data was 
organized by classes of interviewees as well as by the units under study. The categories that were 
used are provided in Appendix D. 
The interviews provided information related to the manner in which ESs are scheduled in 
the hospital. Secondly, the interviewees are able to ascertain, from their perspectives, if the 
current decentralized scheduling is working to the standards that these professionals aspire to. 
Thirdly, if there are any improvements to the scheduling system, they are able to ascertain them, 
as well as the implications related to the implementation of a centralized scheduling system for 
ESs. 
The interviews‘ analysis is performed in the following manner: 1) the interviews are 
firstly segregated by the different units; 2) a different separation is also provided by combing the 
opinions of the specialists within their own profession, i.e. surgeons and administrators; 3) 
another section is provided by revealing the interviewed professionals‘ opinion on the current 
scheduling system, as well their opinions regarding a hypothetical centralized ES scheduling 
method; this also includes the interviewees‘ opinion on the current hospital administration. 
The quantitative aspect of the research refers to different computer simulations of a 
centralized scheduling system. There are 3 centralized scenarios, with different characteristics, 
that are used to compare the output results with the historical data provided by the hospital. 
Historical surgical data of all 
elective surgeries performed within a 
period of 3 years was requested. It 
represented 27,684 entries and the data was 
extracted from the hospital‘s OR schedule 
system. It included the information 
presented in Table 6. 
Patient ID 
Surgical unit 
Surgical ID request 
Principal intervention(type of surgery) 
Surgeon‘s ID 
Date the surgery was planned for 
Date and time when the patient arrived at the 
hospital for its surgery 
Surgery estimated duration time 
Surgery start date and time 
Surgery end  date and time 
Table 6: Historical data requested 
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From this information, the actual duration of the surgery was calculated. The patients‘ 
appointment information for the same 5 different surgical units, i.e. date when a specific patient 
had its visits, was retrieved from the individual surgical units‘ database. There were 342,780 
entries. The latter data was combined with the OR patients‘ ID information using a matching 
SQL (Structured Query Language) script. In case that a patient had multiple visit dates, the 
earliest visit date was chosen to determine the start of the waiting period of the patient‘s surgery.   
 After the data were combined and cleaned  missing information from either data sources 
 there were 15,109 entries. These form the total number of windows of opportunity surgeries 
(called Windows). The schedule used for the simulations has 27,462 entries (called ‗the Wall‘). 
The Wall represents all the surgeries which were performed by the hospital, regardless if there 
was a patient visit date or not.  
The centralized simulation scenarios provide just a computational analysis. Comparing 
them with the actual historical surgeries performed during the same time period, one is able to 
have a proper assessment of the two scheduling methodologies. However, this analysis is 
incomplete without the evaluation of a centralized model by those involved in the planning and 
forming of the ES schedule, meaning the input of the staff that directly is affected and influences 
the schedule itself. As mentioned before, this is one of the key reasons why interviews with the 
hospital staff are performed.  
The triangulation of the qualitative and quantitative components of the study is performed 
in such a manner that the comparison between the simulation results and historical data are 
interpreted by the different perspectives that the interviewees provided, coupled with theoretical 
standpoints presented in the literature review.  
Even though waiting time for ES and its reduction is the topic of this research, this aspect 
has important implications for all the hospital. Many elements are affected by reducing or 
increasing the patients‘ waiting time. This is why other indicators, such as idle OR time, OR 
overtime, rescheduled surgeries, are also vital in order to have a clear analysis if a centralized 





Overall qualitative results 
In order to provide a better picture of how the hospital works and provide the view of 
different staff categories, the following section explains firstly what is important for surgeons‘ 
perspective, and secondly different aspects that are eminent for the administrators. As previously 
mentioned, this information offers the staging of the research question as not only the opinion of 
the different staff interviewed is segregated by the interviewee position, but also it describes how 
booking is performed in the hospital, the interviewees outlook of the hospital administration 
regarding OR scheduling, as well as their estimation and attitude towards the idea of centralizing 
the ES scheduling system.      
 
Surgeons 
Even if there are different methods in which OR time is scheduled to individual surgeons, 
all surgeons would like more OR time. It must be noted that surgery booking and especially 
performing surgery is highly tied to the surgeon‘s remuneration.  
The surgeons are responsible for the scheduling and rescheduling of patients. They base 
their decision on the diagnosis of the patient. It is rare that patients are shared, expect in cases of 
emergencies, because the patients develop trust and history relationships with the surgeon.  
Even though there are tensions at times between surgeons and nurses, these do not affect 
what happens in the OR. For the entire team who is performing the surgery, the patient is the first 
priority.  
Most surgeons have a full OR day allocated to them. However in the cases where an OR 
is split/shared, most surgeons are considerate and avoid, to their best capabilities, not to go over 
the time allocated. Having a dedicated OR to the surgeon ensures that there are no tensions 
between surgeons because one took more time than necessary; however, if it does happen, the 
surgeons who lost some time show forbearance and leniency. The same is applied for emergency 
cases. A good gesture if the surgeon who entered an OR with an emergency case would be to 
give latter on OR time to the surgeon who lost the time. Sometimes this happens, but not always.  
 Different units operate differently, as some share the patient list (1 unit out of the 5 units 
interviewed), some have access to two ORs in the same time, thus reducing the changeover time, 
some use a high efficiency day (1 unit out of the 5 units interviewed), units and surgeons take in 
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consideration the patient and priority is given to the patient. This might create certain tensions 
between surgeons during the emergency-flex OR time as each surgeon fights for their own 
patients and that specific patient is more important than another.  
The estimated surgery times are dependent on the surgeons and on the procedures which 
are performed. As being a general hospital, and thus a teaching hospital, if there is teaching in 
the OR, may it be for residents, nurses or anesthetists, the surgeon is affected for their future 
surgeries. Most surgeons are understanding and support the teaching aspect of the hospital by 
communicating more to the nurses. The booking administrator tries to provide as much 
flexibility to the surgeons for their estimated surgeries as he can. Yet, in the end, the rhythm of 
the surgery, even if it is imposed by the surgeon, it is also dependent if there is any type of 
teaching happening in the OR.  
Some surgeons prefer to refer patients to another surgeon as their own waiting list is 
large. Once again, the patient is the priority. If the waiting lists are not properly managed, it 
creates a monster that is very difficult to manage.  
All the interviewed surgeons believe that OR time is capped due to budgetary reasons. 
Thus, if the budget of the hospital would increase, and more nurses, anesthetists, equipment 
would be present, more surgeries could be performed and thus, reduce the waiting lists. The 
government, through different programs did increase the budgets for specific categories of 
surgeries.  
Surgeons are underutilized. They almost work part time (Interviewee 6). While the 
surgeons understand that the hospital has priorities, sometimes it is felt that there are too many 
priorities. Furthermore, the hospital‘s interests are not the same as those of the surgeons.  
Most nurses have multiple skills and are cross trained, while some nurses are highly 
specialized, especially in the cardiac team. It is important for the surgeon to know who is 
available, OR nurses wise, in order to have a specialized team and the best available team. If 
there is no specialized team, a surgery can be postponed to a later date.  
 
Administrators 
The unit administrators want to serve the unit in which they are. They are the middle man 
between the units and booking. Thus, there are no tensions between the unit administrator and 
surgeons as the former provide services to all the surgeons within the unit. The unit administrator 
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is to be considered an employee of the unit. At the same time, there are no intra or inter unit 
tension between the administrators of the unit and other staff, as reported in the interviews.  
It must be noted that there are 3 main schedules that come together: OR, nurses, and 
anesthetists. These are required to be synchronized in order to have few cancelations due to 
missing resources, may those be staff or equipment. Better integration of resources would 
provide the administrators with greater ability to provide services to the units. 
The administrators of the units only use the resources that are available to them. In order 
to schedule a surgery in most cases, the patient is required to have pre-operative testing, which 
may include also different types of scans. Certain patients have their scans done outside the 
hospital due to a very long waiting for the scans within the hospital.   
Some units use a category priority scheme to prioritize their surgeries. This is useful to 
decide the ‗maximum‘ waiting time that a patient is entitled to. However, there are a lot of grey 
areas between the categories, especially between the first two priority categories.  
Each unit will fight for their own patients, but everyone understands that the organization 
has memory, and long lasting relations with any of the units where there is an interaction is 
desirable; in other words, all units want to have good relations with the other units..  
Surgical categories are a grey zone and some surgeons attempt to game the system. 
However, the OR staff is able to see the misalignments and a surgeon can get a ‗bad reputation‘ 
because of this.  
Even though emergency-flex time is used to reduce the surgeon‘s waiting lists, and 
reschedule the booted patients, there are tensions between the surgeons regarding the priority of 
the patient. Emergency-flex time is considered as extra OR time, with the understanding that an 
emergency would have priority.  
There is room for improvements on the administrative side of the hospital. Common 
knowledge is essential between the staff of a specific unit, but also when information is required 
by another unit. Moreover, the administrators do not have all the patients‘ waiting list.  
All surgeons know that the nurses‘ overtime costs a lot to the hospital. Also, all the 





There is only one booking agent for the entire hospital. It is his responsibility to make 
sure that all surgeries are booked, meaning that each surgery needs to be properly estimated in 
duration and verified with the surgeon. The estimated surgery time is provided by the booking 
program, using the average of the last 10 procedures (of a surgeon); yet, times are manually 
adjusted because the average time is calculated on the first procedure (which most of the time 
overestimates the entire surgery). The booking agent calls the surgeons in order to verify the 
duration of the surgery and adjusts accordingly. The average times for a specific surgeon are 
quite accurate, but they vary from surgeon to surgeon. However, some surgeons believe that the 
hospital scheduling system does not work well.  
It was also mentioned that changeover (another aspect that booking agent must take in 
consideration) may be long in bloody cases; these involve a lot of patient bleeding. This affects 
the next surgery as it cannot start until the OR is sanitized.  
There is a good relation between booking and surgeons. Yet, there is, in a way, tension 
between surgical units as all units would like more OR time.  
All surgical units receive a draft schedule, including OR nursing and anesthetists. The 
last two units build their own internal schedule based on the draft schedule provided by booking.    
The draft schedule is done 7 days in advance. Besides vascular and neurosurgery where 
the cases are booked 48 hours prior, all surgeries are booked 7 days in advance. For these 2 units, 
the block times are always there. Furthermore, out of the 16 ORs, only 12 are functioning due to 
lack of nurses. During vacation and summer, there are only 8 ORs in use.  
There are swaps between surgeons, however, the booking agent needs to be contacted in 
order to make sure that the right equipment is in the OR and ready for use.  
There is a lot of bureaucracy in booking, including a lot of red tape. Most of the work is 
done in silos and because of this, there is a lack of harmony due to communication scarcity. 
Decision made within a unit affect the OR schedule. The booking administrator is not the 
information hub. Information goes around the booking agent, but in the end, it filters in. Because 
of this, the schedule needs to be redone as either there is the wrong information or information is 
simply not there. The information that the booking agent should always have on-hand include the 
availability of mechanical instruments, such as portable scanners, C-arms and C-arms tables, 
schedules of the surgeons, OR nurses, anesthetists, including specialized teams, respiratory 
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technicians and other technicians, availability of beds prior the surgery, availability of ICU beds, 
special equipment requested and required by the surgeon to perform the surgery, including 
specialized surgical instruments.  
If there is an emergency, everything shifts. Moreover, if there is a cancelation, that OR 
time is wasted unless there is an emergency that comes in. Additionally, if there is an opened OR 
at the end of the day and there are no emergencies, that time is lost.  
Even though cancelations occur, they are not under the control of any direct unit: lack of 
OR nurses, no ICU beds, or previous surgeries taking longer than expected. When cancelations 
do happen, the unit staff is frustrated and the OR time lost does not come back to the unit that 
lost the time. All rescheduled patients wait less time for their 2
nd
 scheduled surgery. 
 
Hospital administration  
Waiting time in Quebec is long. The government imposes certain guideline or 
benchmarks. For example, all cancer patients should receive their surgery in 28 days; knee and 
hip surgeries should be performed within 6 months. This is important as the government 
allocates different budgets to what it deems a priority. If a surgical unit becomes a priority for the 
hospital, then that unit would have more resources allocated to it. Thus, it is a question of what is 
the priority of the hospital and of budget.  
The internal scheduling system has its benefits, but also its pitfalls. If a surgery takes 
longer because it is a ‗teaching surgery‘, meaning that either the surgeon, nurses or anesthetist  
are teaching, the surgeon is penalized: the duration of the surgery will be in the system and it will 
affect his future estimated times. The teaching ORs are not taken in consideration in the 
estimated times and the surgeons get penalized in the long run because of it. This aspect is valid 
for all surgical units.  
There are other problems with the scheduling system. Most surgeons would like to have 
more input regarding the estimated times of the surgeries. The surgeons do not dismiss the 
computerized system; they just would like to have some weight assigned to the surgeon 10%-
25% allocated to the surgeon and 75%-90% allocated to the system.  
The booking administrator does a good job shuffling surgeries depending on the 
resources/equipment which are required. However, more transparency and higher levels of 
communication and data transfer would be required in order not to lose too much time building 
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and rebuilding an OR schedule. The equipment is not always updated on the OR schedule which 
causes problems in the perfect allocation of resources for a specific surgery. If the equipment is 
not in the OR, the surgery gets delayed, thus delaying all subsequent surgeries; this may also 
result in cancelations at the end of the day.  
High efficiency days, as performed by E.N.T. could resolve certain issues. However, 
these type of intense surgical days could only work for surgeries performed by urology and 
ophthalmology, where the surgeries are ‗repetitive‘, meaning it is the same procedure and there 
is a low chance of complications during the surgery. The idea of having two ORs, two teams and 
one surgeon is also appealing as it reduces the time that the surgeon waits between surgeries. 
This type of setup would be beneficial to similar surgeries which do not require a lot of time to 
be performed. However, the hospital is interested in the efficiency of the institution not that of 
individual units (Interviewee 10).   
Other problems that the hospital has include the fact that there are a lot of referrals that 
come in from other hospitals and these referrals are given priority. Furthermore, during the 
summer and vacations the OR time is cut by 30 %. The patients are the first ones affected as well 
as the hospital staff. Also, the nurses‘ shortage and more OR time are the major impediments that 
the interviewees mentioned on multiple occasions. 
In most cases, access to OR is easier than access to other resources, such as radiology 
(ultrasounds or MRIs). Some patients prefer to spend 150$ for their scans instead of waiting 6 
months for them in the hospital. There are cases where units cannot abide by the government‘s 
rule of 28 days surgery for cancer patients. Additionally, if a patient is waiting too long, most of 
the time the patient goes outside the hospital to have his surgery.  
 
 Centralization and other issues 
The interviewees are partially divided regarding the use of a centralized system.  
A better and more flexible method of calculating the estimated duration of the surgery is 
required. Better variables/indicators are needed. It is a good idea to see all the patients in the 
same time and to prioritize them under the same rules, with the same information (Interviewee 
12). 
Centralization would be beneficial for surgeons who have a lot of variability in the 
surgical times. Centralization would also provide a better integration of resource management. 
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This might not only be limited to what equipment is required for a specific surgery, but also 
downstream, such as availability of ICU beds. The centralized system should consider all the 
resources required for a surgery as there is a misalignment between OR room, OR staff, ICU 
beds, equipment. This also includes the schedule of the surgeons as all of them would like to 
have full OR days for different reasons: dedicated OR day; a surgeon is more efficient if he is in 
the same place; coming in and out of the OR multiple times during the day would be stressful 
and time would be lost; split ORs would create additional stress and tension between the 
surgeons because they need to be finish ‗on time‘. One of the main questions is how the 
centralized scheduling system would allocate the OR time. 
If the patient is in the middle of the system, centralization would be good for the patient, 
but not necessarily for the surgeon. Surgeons are not only performing surgeries. They have other 
responsibilities, such as clinic hours and working on-call. Their schedule should also be taken in 
consideration if a centralized system is to be implemented. At the same time, nursing and 
anesthetists schedules should be included in the same system. 
Rescheduled patients should be done in the morning in order to ensure that they are not 
booted again. Also, specific algorithms should be used for the diagnostic that would determine 
the wait time, thus the time when the patient receives the surgery. 
However, the system should have the possibility to be manually adjusted. The booking 
administrator should be the hub of all information and all information should come directly to 
him. From an administrative point of view, less bureaucracy is needed in the use of a centralized 
system and an increase of communication. Work needs to not be done in silos.  
―The ultimate [goal] is to get the patient operated on‖ (Interviewee 5). 
Centralization may not work as all the cases are different. The centralized planning 
system and the person creating the schedule do not know the entire story behind each case. ―You 
treat the person, not just the diagnosis‖ (Interviewee 7). Shared patients is not a good idea for the 
reasons previously mentioned.  
Centralization would not work as it requires additional information such as what happens 
in the personal life of the patient, work life (Interviewee 8). Centralization ―loses the human 
touch‖ (Interviewee 8). Not everything can be digitized, included in a computer system 




Peripheral knowledge, medical information that is not directly relevant to the patient‘s 
surgery, does not change how a surgery is performed. Therefore, the information included in the 
system needs to be carefully considered a-priori. At the same time, if centralization is to be 
implemented, it is important who decides the rules of the schedule (Interviewee 12). It was noted 
that the financial agenda is different from the surgeons‘ agenda which is different from the 
patients‘ agenda (Interviewee 12). In order to reduce the waiting list, more resources (OR time) 
is required and not necessarily a centralized booking system. The number of surgeries has to be 
maximized, but within a certain budget (Interviewee 12). 
It is believed that one of the problems with centralization is that some surgeons might 
have more OR time while others might have less.  
Central booking may be more efficient on paper but not in reality (Interviewee 10). 
Furthermore, centralization would have too many details to manage (Interviewee 11). Moreover, 




Simulation and optimization 
According to Banks et al. (2005, p. 3), ―a simulation is the imitation of the operation of a 
real-world process or system over time.‖ The simulation model comprises of the system‘s 
behavioral changes over time. Many researches, from Naylor et al. (1966) to Shannon (1998), 
have found certain situations when simulation is an appropriate analysis tool, described by Banks 
et al. (2005, p. 4): 
 
1. Simulation enables the study of, and experimentation with, the internal interactions of a complex system or 
of a subsystem within a complex system; 
2. Informational, organizational, and environmental changes can be simulated, and the effect of these 
alterations on the model‘s behavior can be observed; 
3. The knowledge gained during the designing of a simulation model could be of great value toward 
suggesting improvement in the system under investigation; 
4. Changing simulation inputs and observing the resulting outputs can produce valuable insight into which 
variables are the most important and into how variables interact; 
5. Simulation can be used to experiment with new designs or policies before implementation, so as to prepare 
for what might happen; 




One can realize that some application areas of such tools could be found in manufacturing, 
construction engineering, project management, military, logistics, transportation, business 
processes, and not the least, health care. At the same time, simulation is a good approach to 
evaluate and measure the objective function value by multiple replications of the system, thus 
providing more information. One of the major benefits of using simulation models is the overall 
low cost of system design changes and their evaluations. However, it must be noted that these 
simulation models only evaluate the systems under study – they do not improve them.  
According to Forester (1980), simulation can be a very useful tool to examine and 
explain dynamic systems that are too complex for mathematical modeling. Levit et al. (1999, p. 
1482) provide a very simple explanation for this:  
 
Model based simulation best represents the dynamic behavior of actual complex 
organizations because relevant objects – activities, participants, messages, meetings – 
from the real world are specifically represented by corresponding software objects with 
defined properties and behavior in the model. 
 
The current model can be considered as discrete events modeling as specific actions are 
taken at specific times via different rules. However, the model can also be thought of as an agent 
based model as the actions of one element (OR surgery planning) affects all the other elements. 
For this reason, the overall model falls under a hybrid methodology where both discrete models 
and agent based models converge and are combined.  
Furthermore, the main goal of optimizing simulation results is to find an optimal solution 
of the simulation model. Such a design requires multiple runs of the simulation. In the present 
case, there were 30 runs (30 simulations) for each of the three scenarios analyzed. For very 
complex optimization situations, especially for those in which the objective function cannot be 
identified directly or when there are multiple objective functions each with their own weights, 
which is the case in the present analysis, simulation provides the necessary answers in regards to 
the main objective function.  
It must be noted that the more detailed the model, taking in consideration many variables, 
parameters and objective functions, the heavier the burden on the computer‘s CPU. This requires 
longer processing time, yet it provides more realistic results. The average running times for the 
simulations used for this research are provided in Table 18. 
61 
 
The current model can be characterized as a 
deterministic model because the parameters 
(coefficients) that are fed in the optimization are 
deterministic, i.e. no stochastic elements are used. At 
the same time, the manner in which the optimization is 
performed, via genetic algorithms, the model is using 
a meta-heuristic method. Therefore, there are elements 
that are both deterministic in nature and others that are 
stochastic. This is another reason why multiple runs 
are required.  
Genetic algorithms (GA) are a subclass of 
evolutionary algorithms which use a search technique 
that imitates the biological evolutionary processes. A 
solution is called an individual; there are many 
individuals in the search space, where the set of 
solutions is called a population. Through an iterative 
development, new individuals are generated using random mutation and/or crossovers functions 
from the individuals present in a given population. Each iteration is called a generation. Natural 
selection ensures the best fit individuals of the current population will participate in the new 
population; this is accomplished as a higher quality of a solution would have a higher chance to 
survive and be selected. Figure 3 shows the generic process. 
Having a multi-objective optimization problem, the goal of the genetic algorithm is to 
find the solutions with the best fitness, which is determined by the different objective functions. 
Deb (2001) showed that evolutionary algorithms are very effective at finding solutions to multi-
objective optimizations due to the multiple population iterations process.  
Genetic algorithms optimization was used as a global search method for the optimal 
solution. This approach avoided finding local optima that could miss out the optimal optimum. 
Furthermore, it also ensured that as the problem is not linear in nature, this would not be of 
concern. Having multiple objective functions, this analysis cannot be performed using MS-Excel 
through the ‗Solver‘ add-in. For these reasons, a tailored optimization program was developed in 
Java using IntelliJ Idea v. 14.1.5, having the following interface: 
 






Figure 4: Interface of simulation program 
 There are 6 objective functions that need to be optimized: 1. Minimization of overtime in 
the OR; 2. Minimization of idle time in the OR; 3. Minimization of booted surgeries; 4. 
Minimization of booted surgeries time; 5. Maximizing the number of surgeries; and, 6. 
Minimization of patients‘ waiting time. There are also 3 important rules: 1. Rest for surgeons 
between surgeries; 2. The ability for a surgeon to work in 2 ORs at the same time; and, 3. 
Making sure that longer surgeries are scheduled in the morning. The program is built in such a 
manner that each objective function and rule has its own weight and the user has the choice to 
change them; this also includes the choice of not including specific objective functions in the 
simulation-optimization (a weight of 0.0).  
 As previously mentioned, each surgery has its own ‗estimated duration‘, provided by the 
internal hospital system. It is this value that is used to calculate the schedule. However, in reality, 
surgeries take longer or shorter time. The subsequent surgeries are dependent on the ‗actual 
duration‘ of the surgeries during a specific day. For example, if a surgery is planned for 8:00 AM 
and it is intended to take 1 hour (having an ending time of 9:00 AM), the following surgery can 
start only at 9:00 AM. If the said surgery takes only 45 minutes, the following surgery will still 
start at 8:45 AM, and the OR would not have an idle time of 15 minutes. However, if the said 
surgery takes 1 hour and 20 minutes, then the following surgery can start at 9:20 AM; hence, it 
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starts late. This is important for surgeons and patients as well. Between each surgery there is also 
a ‗change-over‘ time: cleaning the OR and preparing it for the next surgery. This change-over 
time is not included in the current model as there is a very high variability for it. Change-over 
time can take from 7 minutes in E.N.T. High Efficiency Day to 45 minutes when some cases are 
bloody. The change-over time is dependent on the surgery itself, and this information is not 
known in advance. The historical data provided by the hospital did not include the change-over 
time.   
 
Optimization rules 












Table 7: Notation of the simulation model 
 
Using this notation, the mathematical formulation of the objective functions and rules is then 
provided.     
Minimize overtime. Description: Making the plan with using minimum overtime minutes. The 
acceptable overtime value is the number of minutes that surgery can be scheduled over the 
availability of a room. 
Assignment Room 
vt - visit date (minutes) sr - operating room start time (minutes) 
sa - assignment start time (minutes) er - operating room end time (minutes) 
ea - assignment end time (minutes) aot - acceptable overtime (minutes) 
sap - assignment initially planned start 
time (minutes) 
R - count of operating rooms 








Historical surgery start Patient ID 
Historical surgery end Surgical specialty 
Actual surgical duration Visit date 
Number of times rescheduled Surgeon ID 
Number of times booted Surgery ID 
Historical wait time OR ID 
Simulation wait time Estimated surgical duration 
64 
 
Assignment overtime value:      {
                        
           
         
Rule value for gens:    {
                              
                  
        
                
Work in different rooms at the same time. Description: The rule ensures that there is no 
possibility that two surgeries are planned in the same time in the same OR or two surgeries 
overlap.  
 
          
  ∑{
                                                                   
           
 
   
 
Minimize idle time. Description: This rule minimizes the idle time of an OR. 
OR free time: 
           ∑ (       )                                                  
 
   
 
           ∑     ∑{
                                         
           
 
   
 
 
   
 
Maximize count of surgery. Description: The rule inclines the GA to use as many surgeries as 
possible in the schedule in order to increase the variety of solutions. 
           ∑{
                                                
           
 
   
 
For example, a new day schedule is created. A set of surgeries from the unscheduled queue are to 
be scheduled: 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Each surgery may be in two states {SELECTED; NOT_SELECTED}. If it is in the 
NOT_SELECTED state, then such surgery would not be included into the schedule of this day: 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
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In this case, surgeries 1, 3, 4 are scheduled and 2, 5, 6 are not. 2, 5, 6 are included again in the 
queue and may be scheduled in next iteration. 
Surgery class order. Description: The rule sequences the surgeries depending on their estimated 
duration class. The classes are presented in Table 8.  
            ∑ {
                                                            
           
   
   
 
The model attempts to mimic the reality of elective surgery 
scheduling, taking in consideration that longer surgeries are 
planned to occur in the beginning of the day. These were 
broken into classes, as shown in Table 8. Furthermore, part 
of the optimization procedures, there is a punishment 
function included. For example, if surgeries of categories 
B, C, C, D would be the optimal solution for the surgeries 
to be scheduled, and the optimization algorithm would 
present a solution in the form C, D, C, B, the latter option would be punished, having a lower 
value in comparison with the B, C, C, D solution. The same is valid for all other objective 
functions which do not perform well, i.e. not being a ‗good fit‘.  
Minimize booted count. Description: This rule minimizes the surgery date change count; it 
punishes the chromosome with not-planned surgeries which were previously rescheduled. 
           ∑{
                                                               
           
 
   
 
The difference between a booted surgery and a rescheduled surgery is the following: a 
rescheduled surgery is a surgery that is shifted at least once during the same day. A booted 
surgery is a surgery that was scheduled in a specific date, however due to previous surgeries that 
took longer, this surgery does not fit at the end of the day.   
Minimize booted time. Description: Rule that minimizes the time between the surgery‘s initially 
planned date and the same surgery booted date. The chromosome is rewarded if the booted 
surgery is selected to the plan. 
 
Booted time (days):     
          







A 4 6 
B 3 4 
C 2 3 
D 1 2 
E 0 1 
SPECIAL 6 no bound 
Table 8: Surgical duration classes 
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           ∑         
 
   
  
 
            
    
The ‗booted‘ count only takes in consideration the Window surgeries.  
Minimize wait time. Description: This rule minimize the waiting time of the patient for its 
surgery by summing the wait time of each surgery. 
           ∑         
 
   
 
Fitness function. Description: It is the sum of all the weighted values for each rule. As shown in 
Figure 4, the weights can be selected by the modeler using the side bars. The numbers in round 
parenthesis represent the weight associated with the specific rule (0 to 1). The numbers in 
straight brackets are the normalized weights of the rules; this approach is easier for an analyst to 
compare the relative weights of the rules.  
        ∑ |                        |




There are four main steps in which the model works: 1. Execution; 2. Addressing shifts 
and booting surgeries; 3. Rescheduling surgeries 
taking in consideration the rolling horizon; 4. Provide 
next day computations.   
 
Historical data analysis  
The base line for the analytical comparison is 
the actual decentralized surgical waiting times of 
patients. These values are historical values of 
surgeries which took place at the hospital. 
Table 9 shows the total number of surgeries 
performed by the hospital for a 3 year period. Table 
10 provides only the number of surgeries of the 
Surgical Unit 
Frequency Percent 
Breast Oncology 858 3.1 
Cardiac 1,314 4.7 
Colo-rectal 1,007 3.6 
Dental 154 0.6 
E.N.T. 2,435 8.8 
General surgery 2,790 10.1 
Gynecology 1,776 6.4 
Neurosurgery 674 2.4 
Obstetrics 4 0 
Ophthalmology 8,861 32 
Orthopedics 4,236 15.3 
Plastics 544 2 
Thoracic 237 0.9 
Urology 1,815 6.6 
Vascular 979 3.5 
Total 27,684 100 




surgical units under study and their percentage of 
all the surgeries performed by the hospital.   
The patients who received cardio-surgery, 
thoracic-surgery and vascular-surgery were 
combined in one category: Cardio-Thoracic-
Vascular (C.T.V.). The reason for this grouping 
is twofold: 1. the hospital already combined 
cardio and vascular surgical departments into one 
unit; 2. some patients visited one of the 3 
specialty clinics, yet received the surgery in a different specialty (e.g. a patient visits the cardio 
surgery clinic and receives the surgery under thoracic specialty). 
 The five different surgical units which are used to provide the historical baseline for the 
current model are: C.T.V., Ear-Nose-Throat (E.N.T.), General surgery, Neurosurgery, and 
Ophthalmologic surgery.  
Having surgeries for which waiting time can be calculated provides windows of 
opportunity. The Wall surgeries create the canvas on which the Windows are created. Once the 
windows are created, and empty slots in the scheduling are formed, the simulation program 
attempts to fill in these windows. Figure 5 provides an example of the surgical schedule of one 
day for one specialty and the link between the windows of opportunity and the wall. The first 
step is to identify the surgeries that form the windows; in this example, they are Surgery 1, 2, and 
5. Step 2 is the actual creation of the windows of opportunities. This step ensures that other 
window surgeries (from other days) can be used to fill in today‘s windows. In this case, Surgery 
45, 22 and 73 are the surgeries who are used to take advantage of the windows, using the 
optimization rules previously mentioned. Surgery 1, 2 and 5 are scheduled at a later date. 
Therefore, for this example, Surgeries 1, 2, 5, 45, 22 and 73 are window surgeries who create 
windows of opportunity; surgeries 3 and 4 form the Wall. The latter surgeries are only taken in 
consideration to determine the ‗size‘ (duration) of the windows; they are not scheduled/used in 
the scheduling of the optimization program.  
It is important to note that the windows of opportunity created by the removal of 
Surgeries 1, 2, and 5 are actual times of the specific surgeries. When Surgeries 45, 22 and 73 are 
taken in consideration to see if they fit in those windows, it is their estimated times that are 
 Historical values 
Surgical unit Frequency  Percent 
Cardiac surgery 1,314 4.7 
E.N.T. 2,435 8.8 
General surgery 2,790 10.1 
Neurosurgery 674 2.4 
Ophthalmology 8,861 32 
Thoracic surgery 237 0.9 
Vascular surgery 979 3.5 
Total 17,290 62 







considered. Furthermore, the wall surgeries 3 and 4 do not ‗move‘. The only time that this is not 
the case is when previous surgeries take longer than anticipated. Thus, wall surgeries are shifted 
in order not to have two surgeries overlapping in the same OR.  
 
Surgery 1 (2h) Surgery 2 (1h) Surgery 3 (1h) Surgery 4 (1h) Surgery 5 (1h) 
Step 1. Example of the Wall 
  Surgery 3 (1h) Surgery 4 (1h)  
Step 2. Example of Windows of opportunity 
Surgery 45 (2h) Surgery 22 (1h) Surgery 3 (1h) Surgery 4 (1h) Surgery 73 (1h) 
Step 3. Example of using the Windows of opportunity 
Figure 5: Example of the link between windows and the wall 
 
Table 11 provides the number and percentages of wall and window surgeries as well as 
the relative percentage difference between them. 
 Used for simulation (Wall) Used for simulation (Windows) 
Surgical unit Frequency  Percent  Frequency  Percent  Relative percent 
difference 
C.T.V. 2,530 14.63 1,875 17.10 2.46 
E.N.T. 2,435 14.08 1,708 15.57 1.49 
General surgery 2,790 16.14 1,763 16.08 -0.06 
Neurosurgery 674 3.90 595 5.43 1.53 
Ophthalmology 8,861 51.25 5,026 45.83 -5.42 
Total 17,290 100.00 10,967 100.00 0.00 
Table 11: Surgical units analyzed – Simulation values 
 
Multiple interviews confirmed the manner in which estimated times for the surgeries are 
calculated, for each surgeon: the hospital‘s scheduling computer program calculates the average 
of the past 10 surgeries for each specific surgeon (actual times of procedures). However, a 
surgery encompasses different procedures. The average only considers (or tags) the full duration 
of the surgery of the first procedure. The estimated times provided by the hospital were these 
times and they did not reflect the true estimated times used by the planning administrator. In the 
hospital, the administrator who plans and creates the schedule must be aware of all the times of 
all the procedures of all the surgeons. Furthermore, the planning administrator confirms and 
readjusts these durations with the surgeons prior the master plan is created. In order to simplify 




et = at * (+/- (20% * rand)), 
 
where et is the estimated time, at is the actual historical time of the surgery, rand is a random 
variable that has values between 0 and 0.9999. A surgeon can approximate quite fairly the 
duration of the procedure; however, there is always the possibility of positive or negative 
surprises when performing a surgery. It is for this reason that the 20% rule was applied. Using 
this formula, an estimated time for all the procedures encompassed in a surgery is based on the 
actual historical duration of the surgery, with a potential maximum variation of +/- 20%. These 
values were calculated for each surgery once and replaced the estimated surgical duration values 
provided by the hospital. Using these, Table 12 was created in order to provide an overview of 
the surgeries and some of their indicators. 
Table 12 shows the estimated and actual surgical durations, the difference between them 
(actual – estimated), and the patient‘s wait time in days of the surgeries performed by the five 
units in the 3 year period. A further segregation of the data is also shown in order to illustrate 






























Maximum 918 815 111 1092.59 
Minimum 1 1 -108 0.35 
Mean 165.42 158.22 -7.20 166.64 
Standard 
deviation 
105.67 100.17 19.90 229.52 
E.N.T. 
Maximum 877 821 104 1017.70 
Minimum 6 7 -113 1.54 
Mean 104.03 99.19 -4.84 209.06 
Standard 
deviation 
117.47 111.69 16.37 196.03 
General 
surgery 
Maximum 907 815 117 1070.45 
Minimum 1 1 -127 0.34 
Mean 100.88 96.42 -4.46 171.14 
Standard 
deviation 
135.25 129.62 17.86 190.40 
Neurosurgery 
Maximum 1132 947 113 1088.41 
Minimum 30 32 -185 1.36 
Mean 207.92 197.92 -10.00 150.80 
Standard 
deviation 
158.78 147.39 27.00 184.66 
Ophthalmology 
surgery 
Maximum 381 359 37 1072.38 
Minimum 0 0 -48 0.34 
Mean 35.01 33.39 -1.61 244.62 
Standard 
deviation 
34.13 32.41 5.07 256.83 
Table 12: Estimated and actual surgical duration and patients‘ wait time by specialty 
The surgeries which are of interest are the ones performed in 2013 (January 1 through 
December 31), shown in Table 13. Table 14 has the same format as Table 12, yet only 2013 
surgeries are considered for the former.  
 Total Windows Windows used for simulation (2013) 
Surgical unit 
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
Relative percent 
difference 
C.T.V. 1,875 17.10 618 16.60 -0.50 
E.N.T. 1,708 15.57 629 16.89 1.32 
General surgery 1,763 16.08 635 17.05 0.98 
Neurosurgery 595 5.43 203 5.45 0.03 
Ophthalmology 5,026 45.83 1,639 44.01 -1.82 
Total 10,967 100.00 3,724 100.00 0.00 

















Maximum 918 815 78 575.59 
Minimum 2 2 -103 0.36 
Mean 171.54 164.11 -7.43 133.53 
Standard 
deviation 112.35 106.10 20.82 150.62 
E.N.T. 
Maximum 747 679 83 625.45 
Minimum 6 7 -110 1.54 
Mean 102.86 97.54 -5.32 194.87 
Standard 
deviation 111.13 103.42 17.16 137.84 
General 
surgery 
Maximum 814 737 117 600.57 
Minimum 1 1 -105 1.57 
Mean 98.02 94.26 -3.76 159.21 
Standard 
deviation 129.02 126.37 17.94 139.73 
Neurosurgery 
Maximum 828 719 77 530.37 
Minimum 30 32 -111 2.60 
Mean 217.61 208.12 -9.49 130.82 
Standard 
deviation 159.80 148.37 26.82 121.93 
Ophthalmology 
surgery 
Maximum 294 284 37 618.40 
Minimum 3 3 -34 0.40 
Mean 34.02 32.49 -1.53 193.40 
Standard 
deviation 32.50 30.99 5.02 155.55 
Table 14: 2013 Window surgeries used for the simulation by surgical specialty 
 
Three scenarios are analyzed in order to see if differences in the input parameters would 
provide better (or worse) results in comparison with the historical values. The following setup 
parameters are the same for all 3 scenarios. 
Initial population parameters Population size 100 
Stop solution finding factors 
Number of iterations 2000 
Time execution (minutes) 0.08 
Crossover function parameters Crossover probability 0.05 
Mutation Function parameters 
Mutation probability 0.03 
Selection probability 0.07 
Minimal Request date 1 January, 2013  
All days until surgeries are 
finished 
400  
Rolling horizon (days) 7  




Even though the interest period is of 1 year (365 days – January 1st- December 31st 2013), 
the simulation length was of 400 calendar days. This was performed because the manner in 
which the program works. A surgery from 2013 could be scheduled in 2014; also because the 
scheduling period was finished, 2014 would have only empty ORs. This would skew the results. 
Having a 400 days period ensures that the results of the 2013 surgeries provide data that can be 
used in the analysis. A warm-up period was not necessary as the system and queues were already 
saturated.  
There were 30 runs for each scenario, thus providing a sample size of 30. The different 
scenarios differ in the weight attributed to the following rules: ―Minimize overtime‖, ―Surgery 
class order‖, ―Minimize wait time‖. There is a reason why each of these were selected: Minimize 
overtime – many interviewees stated that overtime should be considered due to the extra cost 
incurred on the nurses side; Surgery class order – Dr. Verter (McGill University) performed a 
study taking this aspect in consideration and showed that longer surgeries performed in the 
morning and shorter ones in the afternoon decrease the potential overtime (Interviewee 3); 
Minimize wait time – the main purpose for the research. Table 16 provides the setup distinctions 
between the 3 scenarios: 
 
 Minimize overtime 
Weight (norm. weight) 
Surgery class order 
Weight (norm. weight) 
Minimize wait time  
Weight (norm. weight) 
Scenario 1 0.5 (7.69%) 0.5 (7.69%) 0.5 (7.69%) 
Scenario 2 0.5 (7.69%) 0.5 (7.69%) 1.0 (14.29%) 
Scenario 3 1.0 (14.29%) 1.0 (14.29%) 1.0 (14.29%) 
Table 16: Difference between 3 scenarios 
The ―Required rest time‖ rule was not included in the optimization; thus, the ―Required 
estimated duration to rest (minutes)‖, ―Required actual duration to rest (minutes)‖, and ―Rest 
time value (minutes)‖ do not apply. 
Historically, some ORs close at 3:15 PM, others at 4:00 PM, and others at 6:00 PM. Not 
having the data about which OR was opened until what time, the simulations obey the following 
rule: if an OR for a specific surgical specialty was opened during a day, the opening hours were 
from 7:45 to 18:00. This provides 615 minutes of open OR time. Additionally, the 18:00 closing 
time also provides a different analytical aspect: all the surgeons interviewed would like to have 
more OR time. They believe, and it is logical, that having more OR time would decrease the 
waiting time and reduce the waiting list. The main reason why all ORs do not close at 18:00 is 
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the budget: either there is no budget for extra staff to keep the ORs opened (nurses, anesthetists), 
or there is no budget for overtime.   
Table 17 presents the difference between the 3 scenarios as well as all of the parameters 
used for the optimizations‘ objective functions weights.   
 
Function  Weight (Normalized weight ) 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Minimize overtime 0.5 (7.69%) 0.5 (7.14%) 1.0 (12.50%) 
Acceptable overtime value (minutes) 15 
Minimize booted time 1.0 (15.38%) 1.0 (14.29%) 1.0 (12.50%) 
Required rest time 0 
Required estimated duration to rest 
(minutes) 
DNA 
Required actual duration to rest (minutes) DNA 
Rest time value (minutes) DNA 
Work in different room at the same time 1.0 (15.38%) 1.0 (14.29%) 1.0 (12.50%) 
Minimize idle time 1.0 (15.38%) 1.0 (14.29%) 1.0 (12.50%) 
Maximize count of surgeries 1.0 (15.38%) 1.0 (14.29%) 1.0 (12.50%) 
Surgery class order 0.5 (7.69%) 0.5 (7.14%) 1.0 (12.50%) 
Minimize booted count 1.0 (15.38%) 1.0 (14.29%) 1.0 (12.50%) 
Minimize wait time 0.5 (7.69%) 1.0 (14.29%) 1.0 (12.50%) 
Table 17: Objective functions and their weights 
*DNA – Does Not Apply 
 
Comparison between scenarios 
The average simulation times of the 3 
scenarios are different. Scenario 1 has the most 
relaxed rules, thus, it is faster than Scenario 2, 
and Scenario 2, for the same reason is faster 
than Scenario 3. The simulations were performed on a laptop having a 64-bit operating system, 
with 6.00GB RAM, and an Intel® Core™ i3-2370M @ 2.40GHz processor. The average times 
of one run are presented in Table 18. 
 
Outputs of the simulation 
There are two main types of outputs of the optimizations, both provided in a CSV file 
format. Firstly, the ‗summary results‘ encompass indicators which are aggregated. These are 
Scenario Average running times 
Scenario 1 227.14 minutes (3.79 hours)   
Scenario 2 290.22 minutes (4.84 hours) 
Scenario 3 314.42 minutes (5.24 hours) 






discussed in the Summary results section. The main results encompass all the information for 
each individual surgery, presented in the Main results section. 
 
Simulation summary results 
There are 4 types of summary results: window surgeries booted, wall surgeries booted, 
idle time, and over time. Furthermore, these results take in consideration all the 400 days of the 
simulations. Therefore, it is assumed that the values represented are on the high end and 
surpassing the 2013 period of the study for idle time. The mean standard deviation was 
calculated by taking the square root of the average squaring of the individual SDs. This approach 
can be used as there are the same number of observations for each unit (30 simulations) and 
because the results are independent events (i.e. one run is not dependent on another run). 
Table 19 provides the results to the total number of window surgeries which were 
planned for a specific day but did not fit in due to previous surgeries taking longer. It can be 
noticed that Scenario 2 provides the best results overall for the surgical units under study. 
Scenario 2 has the maximum weight of reducing the waiting time in comparison with the 
minimizing overtime and sequencing objective functions. Yet, this scenario is detrimental to 



















Window booted count 
(simulation) 
SPECIALTY Max Min Mean SD 
C.T.V. 12 0 3.9667 2.4980 
E.N.T. 12 0 2.9667 2.7604 
General surgery 9 0 2.5333 1.9605 
Neurosurgery 1 0 0.0667 0.2537 




     Scenario 2 
 
Window booted count 
(simulation) 
SPECIALTY Max Min Mean SD 
C.T.V. 4 0 1.3000 1.2905 
E.N.T. 8 0 2.0667 2.0331 
General surgery 8 1 2.0667 1.7991 
Neurosurgery 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 




     Scenario 3 
 
Window booted count 
(simulation) 
SPECIALTY Max Min Mean SD 
C.T.V. 5 0 1.4000 1.1919 
E.N.T. 9 0 1.8000 2.1075 
General surgery 11 0 2.6333 2.4842 
Neurosurgery 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 




Table 19: Summary of booted window surgeries by scenario 
 
Table 20 provides the results to the total number of wall surgeries which were planned 
for a specific day but did not fit in due to previous surgeries taking longer. These surgeries, in the 
present research were not rescheduled at a further date. It can be noticed that Scenario 3 
(maximum weight to all objective functions) provides the best results overall, yet it does not 
have the smallest standard deviation. Furthermore, these results are detrimental to two of the 
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surgical units under study. The booted surgeries analysis cannot be compared with the historical 
data as the latter data was not provided. 
Scenario 1 
 
Wall booted count 
(simulation) 
SPECIALTY Max Min Mean SD 
C.T.V. 3 0 0.9000 0.7120 
E.N.T. 3 0 0.6000 0.8944 
General 
surgery 4 0 1.0000 1.2034 
Neurosurgery 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 




     Scenario 2 
 
Wall booted count 
(simulation) 
SPECIALTY Max Min Mean SD 
C.T.V. 3 0 0.7333 0.8683 
E.N.T. 3 0 0.3000 0.7022 
General 
surgery 5 0 0.8667 1.3060 
Neurosurgery 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 




     Scenario 3 
 
Wall booted count 
(simulation) 
SPECIALTY Max Min Mean SD 
C.T.V. 2 0 0.7667 0.7739 
E.N.T. 2 0 0.5000 0.7311 
General 
surgery 7 0 1.1667 1.8210 
Neurosurgery 0 0 0.0000 0.0000 




Table 20: Summary of booted wall surgeries by scenario 
 
Regarding overtime, results presented in Table 21, Scenario 3 provides the best overall 
results; yet again, this is not valid for all surgical units. The ‗Better %‘ column is calculating, 
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using the Mean values, by how much the results of a scenario are better (positive sign) or worse 
(negative sign) in comparison with the base line data. The ‗SD offset‘ column shows by how 
many standard deviations the historical data is off in comparison with the simulation results, 
where a positive sign is to the right of the simulation mean result, and a negative sign of this 
column is to the left of the simulation results.  
The Ophthalmology surgical unit has the worse results in all 3 scenarios. This can be 
explained by the special characteristics of the unit and how surgeries are planned within this 
specific unit. In most cases, this unit is provided with 2 ORs, one of which is dedicated to 
cataract surgeries. This distinction was not incorporated in the model.  
 




Table 22 provides the results of the summary idle times and the comparison with the 
historical data. For idle times, Scenario 1 provides the best results overall; there are small 
differences between certain units in Scenario 1 and the other scenarios. However, it can be 
noticed that in all scenarios and for all surgical units, the simulation results are worse than the 
historical data. This is explained by the following 2 reasons:  
1. The simulations used ORs that closed at 18:00, thus having more surgeries in a 
specific day;  
2. The time period of the simulation considered 400 days. If the surgeries were finished 
in 380 days, for example, the remaining 20 days were considered as idle time.  
Furthermore, as changeover between surgeries was not included in the simulations, this time is 
also considered idle time by the simulations (in its calculation of this time). Having all these 
elements, it is logical that, overall, idle time would be higher in the simulations compared with 




Table 22: Summary idle time comparison between historical data and simulation results 
 
 
Simulation discussion  
Main results 
The main results encompass the optimizations outcomes for each surgical specialty and 
for each patient, and they take in consideration only 365 days (January 1 – December 31 2013). 
Tables 23 and 24 show for each surgical unit how many surgeries were taken in consideration. 
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Because each scenario has 30 runs, it is easy to calculate how many observations provide the 
population for the analysis.  
The output file of each run is structured in the following manner: the rows identify each 
patient; the columns represent different attributes and characteristics for each patient. Before 
aggregating the results, all the output files were ordered by Surgical ID, as this identification 
mark is unique. This ensures having the same order in all the files. To ease the analysis, an MS-
Excel file was created which combined the results segregated by the run for each scenario. 
Therefore, there were 30 columns adjacent one to another that contained all the waiting times 
(for example) of each patient. Having this approach, it is easy to identify all the attributes for 
each patient per run. Additional sheets were necessary as each one of them was dedicated to a 
specific surgical unit.  
One of the statistics that is interesting to analyze is the number of reschedules performed. 
Table 23 provides these values. Even though the rescheduled surgeries represent less than 2% of 
the total number performed, they still count for use of resources, lost time, and additional stress 
for all the staff. The different scenarios provide better results for some units, but not for all of 
them.  
 
Table 23: Number of rescheduled surgeries 
 
The number of surgeries which were performed by the optimizations on the same 




Table 24: Number of surgeries that kept the historical date  
  
Histograms C.T.V. 1, C.T.V. 2, C.T.V. 3 of Appendix E show, for the C.T.V. unit, the 
surgical estimated duration, actual duration, and the difference between the two (actual time – 
estimated time), respectively. These diagrams are shown as the estimated time of the surgeries 
were changed from those provided by the hospital. It is important to see that from the historical 
duration perspective, the estimated times are coherent. It can be noticed from the histograms that 
the estimated times and the historical ones have almost the same shape. Histogram C.T.V. 3 has 
a normal distribution due to the random variable of the formula used in calculating the new 
estimated times. The histograms depicted in these 3 tables are only for the C.T.V. unit and are 
used as an example. All the other units were verified in the same manner and had the same types 
of histograms.   
 
Waiting times analysis 
The optimizations considered the waiting times in minutes. For an easier read and 
understanding, these times are presented here in days.  
The C.T.V. unit is provided as an example of how the calculations were performed and 
how the data is presented.  
Histogram C.T.V. 0 (Appendix F1) shows the result of the aggregated waiting times per 
patient per scenario. The manner in which these values were calculated was the following: for 
each surgery (the file is ordered by Surgical ID, not by patient ID as a patient may have different 
surgeries within the same unit; if this is the case, when ordering by patient, the order may not be 
the same), the average of all the runs in the specific scenario were calculated. Therefore, the 
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historical wait time can be compared with the average simulation time of each run for each 
patient. The same rational applies to all the surgical units.  
The method in which the results are computed in Table 25 needs explanations. The 
historical values of all the surgeries for all the patients are provide in the ‗Historical‘ cap. These 
represent the maximum, minimum and mean (average) values, as well as the standard deviation 
of these values. As mentioned before, these consider 618 C.T.V. surgeries. For each scenario, the 
maximum and minimum values are also provided (also considering 618 entries). The Mean of 
the scenario results is calculated using the average of the 618 values as well; it is important to 
notice that even if this value is calculated using the average of the 30 simulation results, the 
value is the same. The ‗SD of 30 runs‘ represents the mean standard deviation of the 30 
optimization runs. The manner in which was calculated is by taking the square root of the 
average squaring the individual SDs of the 30 runs. The ‗SD of scenario‘ is calculated by taking 
the overall standard deviation of all the mean wait times for all the patients. 
The ‗Better mean %‘ column shows by how much the simulation results for one scenario 
are better off (worse off) compared to the historical values. A positive sign indicates that the 
simulation results are better than the historical ones.  
The ‗Off-set‘ category is divided in 3 subparts and each shows by how many standard 
deviations a data value is off taking in consideration a mean and its standard deviation. A 
positive (negative) sign shows that the value of interest is to the right (left) of the mean results. 
SD 1 considers the mean (µ) and standard deviation of the historical values, where the value of 
interest is the mean (x) of the simulation. SD 2 and SD 3 consider the mean of the historical data 
as the value of interest (x) and the mean (µ) of the simulations; yet, for SD 2, it is the standard 
deviation of the 30 runs used, and for SD 3, it is the standard deviation of the scenario.  
The ―Better Max %‖ column shows the percentage by which the maximum waiting time 
of the scenarios are better (positive sign) or worse (negative sign) in comparison with the 
historical data. 
The same approach is used to calculate all the results for all the surgical units.   
The following subsections incorporate the simulation results and the qualitative interview 
data. This provides a clear picture of the simulation results that are explained using the interview 
data for each specific unit. Furthermore, one is able to see how the different units are organized 




From Table 25, it can be noticed that Scenario 1 provides the best results for C.T.V.. Not 
only that the mean 
waiting time of this 
scenario is 21.8% better 
than the historical mean, 
but also, the 30 runs and 
the scenario standard 
deviations are smaller 
than the other scenarios. 
The offset positioning of the historical values in all scenarios are within less ¼ of a standard 
deviation. The results indicate that Scenario 1 provides the best results for the patient waiting 
times, followed by Scenario 2 and 3. The results of the last scenarios are very close in mean and 
SD.  
The C.T.V. surgical unit has an administrator who is building the pre-surgical schedule. 
Furthermore, each surgeon has a secretary; some of the secretaries are shared between 
physicians.  
The OR time is proportionately shared between the surgeons. 
There are no interactions with other surgical units. However, there are some tensions 
between surgeons, nurses and hospital administration characterized as ‗personality‘ issues, as 
―some surgeons are more difficult than others‖ (Interviewee 6). However, the problems are under 
control and, as the patient is the main concern, issues between staff ―do not get in the way of the 
patient‖ (Interviewee 1); ―in the OR, the team is a cohesive unit‖ (Interviewee 6). Mainly, it is 
reported that there is no conflict between this unit and other units.  
The patients are not shared between surgeons, even if the Chief of surgery suggested it. If 
patients would be shared, it would create additional problems as the surgeon builds a trust 
relationship with the patient during his waiting. However, urgent cases are shared: if a patient 
who is already on the waiting list comes to the emergency room, the surgeon on call will be the 
one performing the surgery.  
Surgeons would like to work more, to perform more surgeries. The C.T.V. unit would 
like to have more specialized OR nurses, increased budget, more OR time and more ICU beds. If 
 
Table 25: C.T.V. surgeries statistical results 
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these resources are provided, the unit will be able to perform more surgeries, which in turn 
would reduce the waiting list and waiting time of patients. One way to do this is to make the 
C.T.V. unit a priority in the hospital; this would ensure that the unit would have a bigger share of 
the pie. 
It is clear that Scenario 1 also provides the best results for the maximum waiting time, 
having the greatest value by far, with 22.21% better, followed by Scenario 2 and 3. The only 
plausible reason for this is that Minimizing waiting time objective function weight was set at 0.5 
(7.69%), which is lower in comparison with the other 2 scenarios. It can be noticed that the values of 
Scenarios 2 and 3 are close to the historical values.  
 
E.N.T. 
There are 629 E.N.T. surgeries considered. It can be seen from the results that all three 
scenarios are worse off in comparison with the historical values. This is true for the mean 
waiting time as well as for the maximum waiting time. Even though Scenario 1 provides much 
better results for the mean waiting time vis-à-vis the other scenarios, it is 17 days worse than the 
base line. The results 
of the other two 
scenarios are dire. 
Regarding the 
maximum waiting 
time, Scenario 1 is 
worse off by less than 
1%, and Scenario 2 and 3 by a little bit more than 5%. The SD off-sets are less than 1 standard 
deviation. These results suggest that all three scenarios do not help the surgical planning for the 
E.N.T. unit, and the historical scheduling performed by this unit is much better than the 
centralized methods proposed.  
This surgical unit also has an administrator who is responsible for the interaction with the 
OR booking. Secretaries are shared between different surgeons.  
The interviewees reported no tensions within the unit; all the information is common 
knowledge between secretaries, surgeons and the administrator of the unit. There is an open 
communication atmosphere. There are rational arguments for everything that is done in the unit. 
 






There are good relations between the staff of this unit and the OR administrator, and the former 
do not try to game the latter as ―you don‘t live in the moment, you live long period of time‖ 
(Interviewee 7). Furthermore, there are no interactions between this unit and other surgical units. 
The unit is concerned with itself and what it can do for its patients as there is no time to look into 
other units. The last two points are valid and apply to all the remaining surgical units under 
study. 
The interviewed surgeons make the distinction between discontent and disagreements. 
The little disagreements that Interviewee 8 has noticed between surgeons, nurses and anesthetists 
were resolved in the open and in a timely manner. The surgeon is not God in the OR; the nurses 
and anesthetists are also part of the team and surgery is a team effort. 
The following aspect applies only in this unit: there are two surgeons who share the 
patients depending on their OR availabilities; this is done with the rationale that the first priority 
is the patient. Otherwise, patients are not shared between surgeons.  
OR time scheduling is based on seniority, which means it is a question of the length of 
the surgeon‘s waiting list. The scheduling is based on the patient needs and comorbidities, thus 
the patients are triaged. If other surgical units have more OR time, there is a valid reason for it. If 
surgeons lose their OR time due to an emergency, even if they are discontent, they understand 
the situation. The situation is fair and surgeons get along, even though surgeons fight for their 
own patients.  
More OR time and better access to resources would be needed in order to reduce the 
waiting list. However, the unit does the best it can and ―you use the resources available to you‖ 
(Interviewee 7). 
There are three possible reasons why the historical data is different in comparison with 
any scenario. First of all, there a ‗high efficiency day‘ where there is no teaching present for any 
of the professionals who perform the surgery. Even though this method of scheduling is resource 
intensive, it is able to have a high output of surgeries during the specific day. However, ‗high 
efficiency day‘ is only performed by one surgeon. Another reason why the historical values 
might be better than any of the centralized scenarios is that two surgeons share some of the 
patients. E.N.T. is the only unit which has these two different approaches to scheduling and 
performing their surgeries. Moreover, it is also noticed that the OR allocation is based on the 




There are 635 General surgeries that are considered. Scenario 1 provides the best results 
for both the mean and maximum waiting time, with 6.03% and 12.09% respectively better than 
the base line. Scenario 
2 and 3 are worse off, 
having the former 
taking the last place. 
Scenario 1 is better by 
almost 10 days mean 
waiting time and 72 
days better regarding 
the maximum waiting time in comparison with the base line. The results of the other two 
scenarios are dire regarding their mean waiting time, yet still comparable for their maximum 
wait time. The SD off-sets are well within the 1 standard deviation. Therefore, only Scenario 1 
provides better overall results when compared with the base line.  
In comparison with the previous two surgical units, this unit does not have a dedicated 
administrator; it is the responsibility of the Chief of the unit to administer the scheduling. 
Building the OR schedule, the Chief takes many aspects in consideration, such as the surgeons‘ 
preferences and their clinical hours. Qgenda computer program is used for this task.  
The OR scheduling allocation is not based on seniority; it is proportionate to the number 
of surgeons within the unit. OR allocation is also dependent on the surgeon‘s academic 
contribution: if a surgeon has more academic contributions, more OR time is given to that 
surgeon. Within certain groups, the OR time allocation is equal. Most surgeons do not push to 
get more OR time as they know that it will not be given to them, even though the patients‘ 
anxiety is transferred to the surgeons.   
Generally, the surgeons have a full OR day. If it is a shared OR, surgeons try to be 
considerate, not to exceed their allocated OR time which would result in entering another 
surgeon‘s time (Interviewee 12).  
Scheduling of patients is based on the diagnostic as well as the benchmarks imposed by 
the government. If however the waiting list becomes long, there is no manner in which 
 






accommodations can be provided in the OR. In order to address this, some of the surgeons of this 
unit redirect patients.  
There is ―no overt hostility‖ (Interviewee 4) in the unit and a collegial atmosphere is 
present; surgeons are also supporting and accepting of their colleagues. However, it was 
mentioned that there is a certain ‗semi-charged‘ atmosphere between surgeons and nurses, but no 
one will confirm it (or deny it). The only disagreements between surgeons and OR time 
allocation are in the emergency-flex time. These conflicts are resolved by the priority of the 
patient, which it is the anesthetists who are supposed to resolve it. However, the anesthetists 
encourage surgeons to talk between them.  
Furthermore, there are certain attitudes present as the nurses and/or anesthetists ‗pressure‘ 
the surgeon to speed-up the surgery. Residents are slower, but they do a good job. Yet, this is a 
two way street, as it is a teaching hospital and teaching in the OR takes more time for the 
surgery. Due to these elements, at times, it is not a cordial environment. The attitude is presented 
in the form of how comments are made. People have different opinions of how people are 
performing their jobs. As in any big organization, frictions due to different personalities are 
bound to arise (Interviewee 4). 
Finding more OR time is not dependent on the surgeon. Everyone gets frustrated when 
cancelations happen; they occur because there are no ICU beds, after the surgery, for the 
patients. More nurses and anesthetists are required to perform more surgeries. The main 
impediment for performing more surgeries is the budget. Emergency-flex time is given also to 
cancelled/booted patients and all surgeons believe that their patient is more important than 
anyone else‘s, resulting in previously mentioned tensions.  
The schedule changes due to medical reasons. If a patient comes in and is acute, there is 
the possibility that a surgeon can swap their OR time with another surgeon. The time swapping is 
used by all the surgical units where this research is performed. It is the responsibility of the 
surgeon to manage his own list, meaning that it is the surgeon who decides when a patient 
receives the surgery. However, not all surgeons update their waiting lists. Patients could have 
had their surgery in another hospital, patients‘ acuity might have changed, or, worse case, some 
died.  
There is no shortage of surgeons. The absence of more nurses and lack of other resources 
are the major constraint in performing more surgeries.  
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It is clear the Scenario 1 provides the best values. One of the probable reasons is that the 
Minimization of waiting time objective function does not have its maximum weigh.   
 
Ophthalmologic surgery 
There are 1,639 ophthalmology surgeries which provide the analysis results. Scenario 1 
has the best results for the mean and maximum waiting time with 22.29% and 28.06% 
respectively. Scenario 
2 and 3 are worse off 
for their mean waiting 
time (5.07% and 
4.86%), yet better for 
in their maximum wait 
time (1.83% and 
7.2%). There is a 
difference of 43 days in the mean waiting time and 174 days in the maximum waiting days 
between Scenario 1 and the base line values. For Scenario 2 and 3 the differences in the results 
are not prone, save for the maximum waiting time of Scenario 3 which has a difference of 45 
days. Once again, the SD off-sets are less than 1 standard deviation. Therefore, Scenario 1 has 
the best overall results, followed by Scenario 3 and 2, respectively.  
There is no information of this unit having an administrator. However, it is presumed that 
the surgeons have secretaries.  
Cataract surgeries are scheduled on a first come first served basis. However, 
comorbidities ensure that the patient is scheduled faster. This specific aspect was not 
incorporated in the simulation modeling. 
The patients are not shared between the surgeons, as ―it is a doctor-patient relationship 
and not surgical task oriented efficiency‖ (Interviewee 10). ―The patient‘s relationship is with the 
doctor, not with the institution that will get … any surgery done‖ (Interviewee 10). 
It is a pleasant working environment and there are no tensions mentioned between 
surgical units. However, there are sometimes differences in opinions and attitudes between the 
nursing staff and surgeons. 
 





A couple of years ago, cataracts became a priority for the government and as such the 
latter invested a lot of funds in order to reduce the waiting lists because if vision is not resolved, 
the patient might have other problems (they may fall and have fractures, etc.). The number of 
cataract procedures is tied to the individual surgeon. 
Ophthalmology has a different approach in its scheduling the surgeries: there is one 
surgeon, but two ORs and two surgical teams. This aspect was also not incorporated in the 
modeling. This different approach ensures a higher efficiency for the surgeon as he does not 
waste time between surgeries; the patient is already prepped and awaiting in the second room. 
This method of scheduling and performing surgeries is only applied by one surgeon out of 11 
surgeons within this unit. As it will be mentioned latter, this method of scheduling and 
performing surgeries can only be accomplished only for specific types of surgeries. 
There is a lot of downtime in order to setup the patient for surgery. There is also a lack of 
nurses and because of changeover, retirements, and leaves, the OR is less efficient. The same 
type of procedure for the entire day with the same team is the most efficient, and subspecialized 
teams would increase efficiency. Nurses from different services that are not experts in 
ophthalmology would reduce the efficiency of the room. 
It must be noted that ophthalmology lacks the need for the classical hospital resources, 
such as beds, pre-operative testing, radiology. For these reasons, this unit can be considered 
exceptional unit in comparison with other surgical units in the entire hospital.   
As Scenario 1 has the best (22.29% better than the next best scenario) average values, it 
is also believed that having a low Minimum wait time weight is the major contributor for this 
good value. Furthermore, there are certain attributes of the simulation modeling that were not 
considered: first come first service for cataracts, 1 surgeon-2 ORs-2 surgical teams, and absence 
of classical hospital resources. The coupling of these two aspects might provide the much better 
results for Scenario 1, and very close results between Scenarios 2 and 3 with the base line values.  
 
Neurosurgery 
For the 203 Neurosurgeries considered, only Scenario 1 provides better results, yet these 
are negligible for the mean wait time (0.84% better). The maximum wait time has decreased by 
8.35% compared with the base line. Scenarios 2 and 3 are worse off for the mean percentage 
(3.21% and 1.91% respectively) and only 0.21% and 2.04% for the maximum wait time. Even 
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though these results do 
not differ a lot from the 
historical values, they 
are still worse. 
Therefore, it can 
concluded that 
centralization of 
scheduling has a very 
minor benefit for the mean wait time, but better values for the maximum wait time for patients‘ 
surgeries using Scenario 1. The SD off-sets are very negligible.  
Neurosurgery also does not have an administrator dedicated to the unit. However, each of 
the two surgeons of the unit has his own secretaries who are additionally responsible for the 
patient‘s pre-operative testing required. 
Seniority plays an important part in the allocation of the OR times. The reason for this is 
that new surgeons need to build their patient list; thus, the surgeon who has a larger patient-
waiting list would receive more OR time. The emergency-flex time that is allocated each week is 
utilized. Furthermore, this unit has a low volume of patients and it requires little scheduling. 
Moreover, shorter surgeries would ensure that more surgeries are performed in the OR. 
There are no disagreements stated in the interview between the two surgeons of the unit. 
Furthermore, there are no tensions between the nursing staff and the surgeons that were 
mentioned. The OR staff is a cohesive unit and everyone supports each other. 
It is the surgeon‘s responsibility that a patient should receive surgery in a timely manner 
and patients are not shared. In order to manage properly the waiting list, surgeons limit their 
practice, meaning they specialize; the patients not part of that specialty/category, are referred to 
other surgeons. Surgeons who do not refer, usually have long waiting lists. If the waiting lists are 
not properly managed, it ―creates a monster‖ (Interviewee 11).  
Interviewee 11 mentions that having more patients, bringing more patients in the hospital, 
the hospital would need more resource because then ‗you are committed‘. This is part of the 
previously mentioned monster and ―it is like vicious circle‖. 
The reason why the difference between Scenario 1 and the base line values (and actually 
between all the scenarios) is small might be that this unit is highly specialized and that there are 
 





only two surgeons in the unit. The fact that the interviewee stresses the importance of proper 
management of the waiting list, making sure that the waiting list does not grow considerably 
through the process of referrals, and taking in consideration that this unit has the lowest average 
historical waiting time (having also a very close standard deviation to the average value) might 
explain the close results between all the scenarios analyzed.  
 
Patient waiting time  
In order to see the results in an aggregated manner, Tables 30 and 31 show the mean and 
maximum waiting times for the different units 
using the different scenarios. Table 30 provides 
the waiting days; Table 31 provides the 
ordering of the scenarios for a specific measure 
while a smaller number is better than a larger 
number.  
It is clear that the Scenario 1 provides 
the best results regarding average and 
maximum waiting time for surgeries within 4 of 
the 5 units under study. The exception is the 
E.N.T. unit where the best results are provided 
by the historical values. Furthermore, Scenario 
2 provides the worse results overall.  
It must be mentioned that there are 
certain situations in which one scenario is better 
(or worse) by a very little margin. A good 
example is E.N.T. Historical and Scenario 1 for their maximum waiting time; the difference 
between these is only 3 days. Another example is General surgery average waiting time in 
Scenarios 2 and 3; the difference is only 4 days.    
 
 
Table 30: Aggregated waiting times (days) 
 





Windows booted count (simulations) 
As the data provided by the hospital did not 
include this approach, there is no historical data to 
be considered for surgeries which are of interest.  
Tables 32 and 33 show the number of 
window surgeries that were scheduled in a day but 
had to be rescheduled in another day because the 
previous surgeries within a day took longer than 
expected.  
It is clear that Scenario 2 offers the best 
results, meaning that it has the lowest number of 
booted surgeries. Neurosurgery has the same 
amount (0.0) of booted surgeries in Scenarios 2 and 
3. For this reason, these scenarios are considered to 
have the same ranking.  
There are some important discrepancies 
between some scenarios (for C.T.V. Scenario 1 and 
2 maximum amount – difference of 8 surgeries), yet 
there are also some minor differences in other units 











Table 32: Window surgeries booted 
count 
 







The historical value of OR overtime is 
only considered as the average overtime. It 
must be reminded that the simulations in all 3 
scenarios have a longer duration in the ORs. 
Therefore, the results for this indicator are 
slightly misleading.  
The results are mixed. For some surgical 
units, a scenario is better (4 overall points for 
Scenario 2 with C.T.V. as the unit which is best 
suited for this scenario), yet for other units a 
different scenario is better (3 overall points for 
Scenario 3 with General surgery as the unit 
which would benefit the most). Quite 
interestingly, for Ophthalmological surgeries, 
neither scenario is better in comparison with the 
historical values.  
Once again, the differences between some of the scenarios is marginal (neurosurgery is a 












Table 34: Aggregated overtimes (minutes) 
 





Idle time  
 The historical value of OR idle time is 
only considered as the average idle time. It must 
be reminded that the simulations in all 3 
scenarios have a longer duration in the ORs.  
It is clear that the base line provides the 
best results for the average idle time and 
Scenario 1 for the maximum. It should be 
mentioned that if the OR time is increased 
during a day, there is a strong possibility that 
the idle time increases as well. It can also be 
noticed that the differences between some of the 
scenarios for certain units (e.g. C.T.V. mean) 
are very small.  
It could be argued that the results for 
this indicator are misleading as in the case of 
overtime. However, the baseline values are very 
close to most of the values of the scenarios which provides the next best results. For this reason, 
these estimates are not misleading.   
Having the same argument, it can be concluded that there are two reasons why the 
historical values are ranking low in the overtime indicator are: 1. increased OR time; 2. hard 
schedule cutoff. The second point refers to the fact that even if it planned from the beginning, 
surgeries cannot surpass the closing time; furthermore, there is a 15 minutes buffer (which is 
considered in the overtime calculations). In reality, the surgical schedule is re-assessed during 
the day. This means that nurses and anesthetists re-evaluate the schedule during the day. Errors 






Table 36: Aggregated idle time (minutes) 
 





COMING TOGETHER  
From these results, it can be concluded that while some scenarios are better than others, 
the difference between a better or worse one is minimal in certain cases. This is valid for all the 
surgical units and for the average and maximum values considered. Therefore, the management 
of the hospital should also consider the differences between the scenarios in order to conclude if 
a scenario is really considered better in comparison with another. The best approach would be to 
consider percentage brackets (which would be adequate as it normalizes the values, thus being 
able to compare likes with likes): if the percentage difference is under the threshold bracket, then 
the difference is not considered as minimal. The percentage thresholds could only be determined 
by the hospitals management.  
 One aspect which needs to be 
considered is the fact that each optimizing 
formula is dependent, which is easier to notice 
with the normalized weights, on all the other 
optimization objectives. This assessment is 
perceived by observing the outcome results of 
the three scenarios. Responding to the needs of 
one type of stakeholder has direct implications 
on other stakeholders. Therefore, it is not only 
important for management to consider only 
what it needs to be optimized (for example minimizing the wait time for patients), but also 
consider the following question: if factor X is the most important one to be optimized, what other 
factors and optimizations are considered for this result? This aspect also emphasizes a crucial 
element regarding optimization and simulation problems: they are a decision-support tool, not a 
decision-making one.  
Aggregating all the scenarios‘ ranking, including the historical values, provides the basis 
of Table 38. The manner in which the values are calculated is the average ranking for each 
scenario (a lower value represents a better scenario). It must be noted that for Windows booted 
count indicator, the OR overtime and Idle time – Maximum values were not included in the 
calculations. Table 38 provides the ranking of the average values for each scenario. These 
represent the overall ranking, at the hospital level. There are no weights attributed to either 
 





indicator; the hospital‘s management might find it appropriate to weight the different indicators 
based on the importance that the former would consider, based on the different pressures that 
certain stakeholders might have.  
Some of the aggregated results for certain units are very different in value. Overall, 
Scenario 1 ranks the best between all the scenarios, followed by the base line, Scenario 2 and 3, 
respectively. Yet, the difference between this scenario and the historical values is minimal.  
Surprisingly, Scenario 3 provides the worse values, even though all the weights of the 
optimization rules were at their maximum. A plausible explanation is that it is not only the 
weights of a particular rule that is important, but its relative strength to the other rules.  
Therefore, it is strongly argued that the decentralization or centralization within certain 
surgical units is extremely dependent on the instruments which the hospital‘s management has at 




The Discussion section presents various perspectives and interpretations regarding the 
theoretical, qualitative and quantitative inferences of the present research. The qualitative 
interview data provides the prism through which the different theoretical aspects are 
summarized. Furthermore, different elements of contingency theory (including resources, 
management, and different stakeholder‘s perspectives) are also incorporated, providing thus the 
special traits present in a hospital setting. Specific attention is paid to the 5 units that were 
studied; these are also coupled with quantitative outputs of the computer simulations. This 
section also provides different interpretation and tables which show certain variables that would 
work better in a centralized or decentralized structure, consequently providing the general ideas 
of which system has a superior configuration.  
The models presented by Bunderson et al. (2000) are very present in the hospital under 
study. The bureaucratic model can be felt though the entire hospital, in all the units visited. The 
institution is built in such a manner that it fosters coordination between units, it aims to be as 
efficient as possible within some important constraints, such as providing cancer patients their 
surgeries within 28 days and within a very tight budget. The budget aspects also lead to the 
understanding of how the hospital falls under the umbrella of the market enterprise model. There 
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is a fierce competition between hospitals regarding patients, as it is the number of patients 
serviced by the hospital that determines the budgetary allocations provide by the government.  
As the hospital staff is highly trained with a high degree of technical competence, it is 
easy to see why this institution can also be explained by the professional group model. The 
community service model, explained by Bunderson et al. (2000), caters to the needs of the 
population as the hospital is intended to apply its professional expertise to society at large. 
Therefore, it can be argued that the budget and population are the external driving forces of the 
hospital; the internal forces that align these interests with the interests of the internal stakeholders 
are the bureaucratic processes that consider division of labor and specialties, including as well 
the differences in authorities, and the coordination mechanisms that make the hospital work in an 
efficient manner.  
It can be stipulated that the creation of the ES schedule is a uniform event because it is a 
repetitive task and it is performed by a highly skilled employee. However, the element that 
characterizes the best scheduling formation as a uniform event is the fact that the environment is 
constantly changing: every day, there are new patients that have very specific needs, the 
resources available are in constant flux, and the staff performing the surgeries falls under 
different categories that need to be coordinated (nurses, administrators, surgeons, anesthetists, 
respiratory technicians, etc.). 
All these contribute to the difficulties to administer any hospital. However, the task is 
exponentially more challenging when the hospital is a general hospital. Wilson (1963, p. 69) 
describes very well the different facets of this institution: 
 
The large general hospital is the prototype of the multipurpose organization; it is a 
hotel and a school, a laboratory and a stage for treatment. All these purposes, their 
attendant values and specialized personnel, must be somehow articulated into a 
going concern. Co-ordination of specialized activity into a whole that makes 
organizational sense is the huge and delicate task of the administrator, a task that is 
never completed to anyone‘s entire satisfaction. 
 
 One of the elements that are present in any type of hospital is the different hierarchies. 
As different staff is trained for a specific specialty (nurses, surgeons, administrators), all can be 
placed in different hierarchies. Within each domain of expertise, different actors compete for 
authority and for resources. Yet, as Litwak (1961) maintains that providing each stakeholder the 
decision authority within his own tasks, it decreases the hierarchical structure and transforms it 
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in a more ‗collegial‘ relationship between staff. At this point, it is the administrator‘s duty to 
coordinate between all the units and the staff of the units, while taking in consideration all the 
different demands and requests that the actors have.  
The literature suggests that there are tensions and anxieties between the surgeons and 
nurses. However, in the hospital under study this aspect was not present. There were no vivid 
conflicts reported between the members of the different staff groups of surgeons, nurses or 
administrators. The only tensions between surgical units are grounded on the desire of each unit 
to have more OR time; however, the allocation of the OR time to units is based on elements 
exterior to the units themselves. The little disagreements between surgeons and nurses are 
minimal and were characterized by several interviewees as ―different personalities‖ in a big 
organization.  
Even though the absence of tensions and conflicts is not characteristic of most hospitals, 
Litwak (1961) showed in his study that the medical and administrative systems can coexist 
together without any clashes. It seems that the staff of the hospital presented in this research 
acknowledges and conforms to the pre-allocation distribution of authority. As in Litwak‘s (1961) 
analysis, there is minimal friction between the nurses, surgeons and administrators as they are 
aware that certain decision are to be made having local discretion, while others decisions are 
made in a centralized manner, especially when it comes to the coordination of all the elements 
that affect the creation of the surgical schedule performed by a specialist.  
The literature also argues that both nurses and physicians have different perspectives 
when it comes to patients. However, one element is constant in the interviews performed: the 
importance of the patient, and the desire to provide the best care possible to the patient. It is for 
this reason that ‗negotiations‘ are performed between the stakeholders. As Interviewee 8 
mentions, the nurses and anesthetists are part of the OR team, and the patients‘ conditions and 
procedures of the surgery are discussed prior the surgery as well after the surgery is performed. 
This aspect also shows that there is a collegial and cordial atmosphere and communication is 
done in an open manner. This is also valid between units and different staff of the units. 
Even if Martin (1980) distinguished between the administrative and clinical hierarchies, 
in the present hospital, these two elements do not contradict each other: in fact, they support each 
other, having as the common denominator the interests of the patient. To reiterate, all the staff of 
the units interviewed place the latter as the top priority within the unit. 
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As such, the bureaucratic segregation of skills does not impede the professional authority 
which the different professions have within this hospital. This results in the following 
conclusion: the three different staff categories that were studied realize their roles and duties, and 
the authority realms rarely overlap. It is for this reason that it could be argued that this hospital 
behaves in the same manner as the one in Litwak‘s (1961) study.  
Regarding decentralization and centralization structural setup, it can be seen that certain 
decisions are made in a decentralized manner. These include the surgeons‘ decision to manage 
their own waiting lists, to decide when a patient will undergo surgery, shifting more acute 
patients by making sure that they receive their surgery faster. However, the surgeons need to 
plan their surgeries based on the OR time allocated to them. The OR distribution is accomplished 
through a centralized manner as the OR time is spread by the Chief of surgery to the individual 
surgical units, and the Chief of the unit re-distributes it to the surgeons within that unit, based on 
some criteria. Furthermore, the coordination of all the units and the creation of the Master 
Surgical Schedule are also done through a centralized method. Only a centralized system can 
provide the best coordination mechanism, as argued by Interviewee 5. However, most 
interviewees believe that the full centralization of the entire scheduling system might not be a 
very effective structure. Therefore, certain decisions still need to be made at the unit level, thus 
maintaining a partly decentralized organization. 
As mentioned before, the hospital needs to adjust itself to different demands, may those 
be internal or external to the organization, as per the four models of Bunderson et al. (2000). In 
order to do so, contingency theory is able to explain very well the manner in which the 
organization is searching to have the best fit to its environment and to provide the best services 
to its constituents. Figure 2 explains very well the balance between the environment, the 
resources, which most of the time are provided by the environment and management in its quest 
to utilize in the best way those resources. One of the biggest constrains of the hospital is the 
budget, its greatest resource. Having a bigger budget, the hospital‘s management could increase 
the number of hours of the ORs. This would result in performing more surgeries, reducing the 
waiting list and waiting time of patients. The argument made by Luthans and Stewart (1977) that 
the goals of the organization are set by the different stakeholders takes in consideration not only 
the accomplishment of those goals within the different constrains, but also demands a very high 
coordination between the four models of Bunderson et al. (2000).  
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It must be mentioned, as it was done before, the performance difference between certain 
scenarios in the quantitative simulations of this study is very small; this is not to overshadow the 
grater differences in the values of the scenarios under consideration. However, if there is a big or 
a small difference between two scheduling methods, the one which prevails is the one that ranks 
higher; it does not matter if the outcome is 1 day or 50 days, the scheduling procedure which has 
the better value is considered as ‗the best‘. It is for this reason that the threshold brackets are 
recommended. Furthermore, for the small differences between the historical values and a 
centralized scenario, it must be reiterated that the OR time during a day was increased in the 
simulation from the original historical counterpart. This may be one of the reason why there is a 
better (or worse) scheduling system when the decentralized one is considered in contrast.  
The main indicator which this research aims to compare between surgical units and 
between the centralization scenarios and the decentralization method of surgical planning is the 
time that patients wait for their surgery. It must be noted that centralization Scenario 1 provides 
the best results for 4 out of the 5 units under study with reference to patients‘ waiting time. This 
is valid with reference to the other two centralized scenarios as well as to the decentralization 
scheduling approach. The surgical unit where the historical values (decentralization) are better 
than any centralization scenario is E.N.T. This can be explained by three different aspects 
through which this unit schedules its surgeries: high efficiency days (as no training is performed 
during surgery and it is a resource intensive day), shared patients between two surgeons 
(improving the sequencing of patients), and OR allocation based on the waiting list.  
It can be noticed that the Neurosurgery unit has the smallest difference between the base 
line and Scenario 1, 1 day. It is interesting to observe that of all the surgical units, this one has 
the lowest number of surgeries performed during the 1 year period. Furthermore, the average 
time of the surgeries performed by this unit is a lot longer than any of the other units. As it was 
mentioned by one of the interviewees, centralization would not be appropriate for this unit as 
there is little variability between the surgeries, the waiting list is properly managed by referring 
patients to different surgeons, and the fact that this unit has the lowest number of surgeons: 2. 
Having a few surgeons in a unit simplifies the decentralized coordination; this is based on the 
idea that surgeons share the same values, focused on patient priority, and have good knowledge 
about each other‘s constraints.   
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The Ophthalmology surgical unit has the most surgeries analyzed, and this unit has the 
greatest difference between centralization Scenario 1 and the historical values: 43 days. 
Therefore, it can be argued that Scenario 1 provides the best average results for patient waiting. 
The same can be said for the maximum time waited by the patients, with a difference of 173 days 
(as the historical values are the worst in comparison with all the other scenarios analyzed). It is 
of note that this unit has a first come – first served scheduling for cataract surgeries. However, all 
other types of surgeries are triaged based on the diagnostic and performed in due time. All other 
units also use the diatonic of the patient in order to determine the surgery date. The fact that this 
unit has a 2 ORs-2 teams-1 surgeon scheduling procedure for specific surgeries should not 
greatly affect the mean wait times as this method of scheduling is only used by one surgeon. It is 
also surprising that this unit has the greatest difference in average wait times as this is the only 
surgical unit of the hospital which does not utilizes extra hospital resources, such as anesthetists, 
ICU beds, and others. A possible reason explaining these results is the fact that the scheduling 
algorithms of the simulations did not take in consideration two important aspects regarding the 
scheduling procedures of this unit: there are only two rooms dedicated to ophthalmology, of 
which one is dedicated to cataracts; there is a first-come-first served scheduling procedure. These 
factors introduce constraints and routines into the scheduling procedures and they were not 
included in the simulation modeling, which could be the reason for this great difference between 
the hypothetical scenarios and the historical values.    
There are only 10 days difference between the centralized Scenario 1 and the historical 
average data for the General surgery unit. This difference is smaller in comparison with any 
other scenarios analyzed. One important element of this unit is that it has the greatest number of 
surgeons in comparison with all the other units analyzed. Furthermore, it was the only unit that 
mentioned the use of the Qgenda scheduling program which takes in consideration the OR times, 
the surgeon‘s preferences, and the surgeon‘s schedule. The latter features were not incorporated 
in the simulation modeling as this research primary focus in on OR disposability and sequencing 
of patients. However, these factors even if they are important at the hospital and unit level, make 
salient notice assertions that the decentralization of the schedule helps this specific unit. 
As mentioned before, the C.T.V. unit was considered as a conglomerate of 3 units: 
cardio-surgery; vascular-surgery; and, thoracic-surgery. Even though two of these units were 
merged together by the hospital, for various reasons, it provides an almost 30 days difference 
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between the centralized Scenario 1 and the historical base line. Not considering any other 
scheduling procedure which is different between all the units, and that this unit has many 
surgeons, with surgeries which vary in actual time and diagnostics, it is safe to assume that 
centralization would provide improvements on the average waiting time of patients.   
It is important to note that any canceled surgeries are not considered in the historical data, 
as this information was not provided by the hospital. There is a high probability that patients 
were scheduled for their surgery but were canceled, thus being rescheduled and receiving their 
surgery at a later date. The cancelations, which are not dependent on a specific unit, are not 
dependent on a unit‘s prerogative: emergencies coming in the hospital shift all subsequent 
surgeries; lack of resources after a surgery is scheduled (ICU beds, absent nursing team, absent 
anesthetists).  
All the staff that was interviewed for this study do not recommend the centralization of 
all aspects related to elective surgeries. Segregating stakeholders by their role, Table 39 is 
presented. Regarding the schedules of the different staff, some aspects need to be centralized 
while other decentralized. 
Category  Centralization Decentralization 
Patients X   
Staff schedule (surgeons, nurses, OR staff) X X 
Booking - patients (high level) X   
Table 39: Centralization vs. Decentralization – Stakeholders 
 
Table 40 indicates if a centralized or decentralized system would respond better (provides 
better results) regarding certain indicators that were used in the simulation of this study. It can be 
notice that most of them would perform better in a centralized configuration. 
Category  Centralization Decentralization 
Many patients X   
Short surgical duration X   
OR overtime X   
OR idle time   X 
High number of surgeons within a unit  X   
High number of surgeries for a unit X   
Highly complex surgeries   X 
Different variety of surgeries performed within a unit X   
Cancelled surgeries X   
Table 40: Centralization vs. Decentralization – Simulation indicators 
103 
 
Analyzing the organization as a whole, as well as the different units that were studied 
utilizing also different theoretical perspectives, Tables 41 and Table 42 are created. As the 
hospital is a very complex institution where there are many stakeholders (internal and external) 
with various interests, and different resources are required in order to provide the best services to 
the patients, coordination is crucial. As it was mentioned before, McKee and Healy (2000) 
believe that centralization helps to manage high volumes of work, and Moch and Morse (1977) 
maintain that within a hospital, an organization that is functionally differentiated, requires a 
superior level of integration and increased coordination.     
 
Category  Sub-category  Centralization Decentralization 
Integration of 
resource management 
equipment X   
upstream physical resources 
(ICU beds) 
X   
downstream surgical resources X   
OR rooms 
staff schedule X   
equipment X   
OR time allocation 
top to bottom X   
within a unit X X 
schedule X   
Financial agenda 
patients X   
surgeons   X 
nurses   X 
booking X   
hospital management  X X 
Table 41: Centralization vs. Decentralization – The hospital (part 1) 
Category  Centralization Decentralization 
Patients receiving the surgery (sequencing)   X 
Sharing patients   X 
Patient swapping capabilities   X 
High variability for surgical times  X   
Standardized procedures X   
Low variability of surgical procedures X   
High number of interactions within and between units   X 
High variability in work tasks   X 
Organization of professionals   X 
Medical hierarchy (expertise)   X 
Administrative hierarchy X   
Coordination X   




The present study has certain limitations. For example, the radiology department needs to 
be taken in consideration as many surgeries are ‗delayed‘ due to lack of timely access to 
radiology. Furthermore, the anesthetists are also an important element in the process of the 
surgery. Even though they do not contribute a lot to the planning of the surgery, their expertise is 
required during the surgery. Without this resource, the surgery cannot take place. Also, they can 
accept the last surgery of the day or get this surgery rescheduled, resulting in cancelations.  
 A simulation should be built in such a way that it is able to track the patients and their 
respective surgeries. Having a time frame, 365 day, that was increased to 400 days in order to 
ensure that all historical surgeries are performed, influences certain indicators which result in 
high values for the latter. Additionally, the schedules of the OR nurses, the anesthetists, as well 
as the surgeons are not taken in consideration for this study. In order to have a clear view of OR 
scheduling, the schedules of all those involved in the OR should be considered.   
More in-person interviews should be performed with the staff of the hospital. One crucial 
element that could provide additional insight in the potential conflicts and tensions between the 
OR nursing and other units is the additional interviews with OR nurses. Even though the OR 
nurse interviewed has a high administrative ranking in this unit, providing her with a clear 
picture of what happens nurse-wise in the OR, more direct interviews with the OR team leaders 
of the nurses should have been performed in order to have a clear image of the interactions of 
this unit.  
Moreover, a cancer diagnostic was not taken in consideration during the simulations. All 
historical surgeries performed felt in the same category of importance; this means that the 
prioritization of surgeries (may it be cancer or acuity) was not taken in consideration.  
This study is only limited to one general hospital in the Montreal‘s region and only to 5 
out of 11 surgical specialties present in the hospital. A more detailed study is required taking in 
consideration the following aspects, just to mention a few: different hospitals which provide 
surgical services; multiple units within the same hospital should be correlated to different 
hospitals; schedules of all staff involved in the OR operations; the entire chain of pre-operative 
testing ending with the patient‘s discharge form the hospital – this would include radiology as 
well as ICU unit bed allocation; inclusion of emergency surgeries performed which shift the pre-




As it has been noted by others before, there is a tendency to bureaucratize the hospital, 
i.e. to use the Weberian model. Yet, the administrator must take in consideration that physicians 
are free professionals who can change one organization for another. Wilson (1963, p. 74) 
specifically warns about this aspect as ―one key problem for the future of hospital organization is 
the juxtaposition of this rising tide of bureaucracy and the free professional.‖  
According to Duncan (1979), organizational design can be explained by the interactions 
of and between human resource, technology and tasks which ensure that the organizational 
objectives are being fulfilled. In such a design, mechanisms need to be expertly integrated in 
order to facilitate coordination between actors and sub-divisions (Mintberg, 1983). Taking this in 
consideration, Nadler and Tushman (1988) state that formal linkages (such as communication) 
need to be present to assist the coordination effort. In the present context, some aspects of 
scheduling planning do provide better results, such as high variability for surgical times, 
standardized procedures, low variability of surgical procedures, OR time and rooms allocation. 
These also include units with the following characteristics: many patients, short surgical 
duration, high number of surgeons and surgeries. All these are linked to situations that are 
considered uniform events by Litwak (1961). Furthermore, the informal links are also important, 
and in some cases crucial for the patient. It was mentioned that surgeons do swap OR time due to 
the arrival of an acute patient. Without good relations between surgeons, between their 
respective administrators, thus between units, swapping would not be possible.  
The hospital needs to balance all the needs and demands of all the stakeholders. It is for 
this reason that certain decisions need to be taken in a decentralized manner, yet others need a 
centralized process. The balance mechanism falls under the centralized paradigm and consists 
essentially of the coordination of all the resources of the hospital. The results of the analysis 
show that for different units, centralization of their processes is not beneficial, especially for 
those that have a low number of patients and a low variability of surgical 
interventions/procedures. Interestingly, this is contradictory to conventional contingency theory. 
The key factors explaining this contradiction seem to be that (1) surgeons operate in a context 
where cultural and social values are strongly shared (professional), and (2) other factors that are 
normally better managed through centralization (physical infrastructure, availability of 
106 
 
personnel) become less burdensome to coordinate in a decentralized way when those working 
the ‗shop floor‘ have immediate access to and better familiarity with their utilization. 
Every diagnostic is different and the hospital focuses on the patient and his needs 
primarily and on all the patient‘s characteristics. The surgeons treat the patient, not the disease. 
According to NHS Sustainable Development Unit (2011), a sustainable healthcare system has: 
an approach focused more on the personal rather than the professional; a stronger emphasis on 
the societal wellbeing rather than on sickness; and, the use of resources in a balanced way, 
minimizing waste. Most of these elements are taken in consideration in the current general 
hospital. The only problem with the latter, regarding its ability to schedule and perform more 
surgeries is the budget: a larger budget would result in more nurses, more equipment, more time 
in the OR, more surgeries performed, all leading to shorter waiting lists and waiting times for the 
patients. This would answer Friedson‘s (1978, p. 980) statement that ―the final major segment of 
the health system is the health consumer.‖ The entire (healthcare) system must be set-up in such 
a manner as the patient receives what it needs when it needs it. It is the duty and obligation of the 
hospital to ensure this high standard goal.  
In the general hospital in which this study was performed, there is a good atmosphere 
between all the actors involved in the scheduling of elective surgeries, there are no tension and 
disagreements between the stakeholders. In other words, a strong professional culture facilitates 
interaction and coordination, as expressed by the work of Bunderson et al. (2000).  
The simulation results do show that centralization provides better waiting times in 
comparison with the current decentralized method of scheduling surgeries. However, it is not 
only the OR time which should be considered: surgeon‘s schedule, OR nurses‘ schedule, 
anesthetists‘ schedule, equipment, calling-in sick of different members of the OR team.  
If there are parameters that are predictable, having thus a low level of uncertainty, 
centralization is recommended; however, if there are variable factors not known in advance, 
decentralization is a good decision structure. This is valid for the entire hospital as an 
organization, including the units and sub-units involved as the variability of the work performed 
include different tasks to be carried out. The latter aspect creates differences in the coordination 
required to have a balanced system. These can be easily seen in Tables 40, 41 and 42 as the 
higher the hierarchy or having a central position (booking agent) requires centralization of 
decision making and resource allocation. However, at the lower levels of the hierarchy where 
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decisions need to be taken rapidly combining different important patient characteristics, 
decentralization provides a better structure.       
In order to have a definitive verdict if centralization is required in a hospital, a few 
aspects must be considered: 
1. Centralization may not be beneficial for all the surgical units; 
2. The analysis must be focused on a specific unit; 
3. Additional indicators must be considered, not only patient waiting time, idle time 
and over time of the OR; 
4. Hospital management must have clear thresholds in order to determine if one 
scenario is better than another.  
A more in-depth analysis of all the stakeholders, comprising also of all the elements which affect 
the scheduling and performance of a surgery, should be undertaken in order to have a better view 
of all the interactions which take place between actors and units, in order to reduce the elective 
surgery waiting time of patients. However, an important feature of centralized system that should 
be incorporate is the capability to be manually updated and adjusted the system, which is 
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Appendix A: Aspects to be considered  
 
 
“(1) Consideration should be given to the potential benefits of adopting the operational team-working 
paradigm, taking account of the evidence linking team-working and health quality outcomes (West et al., 2002; 
Gunasekaran et al., 2000). 
(2) Assess the present operational structure regarding its appropriateness for patient pathway centered care, 
as opposed to the current organizational clusters of medical specialties. 
(3) There is a need for a much clearer operational performance framework within the organization at operating 
unit level. A simple balanced scorecard approach (Chatziaslan and Bamford, 2005) would be easy to design and 
link back to group and organization objectives. The advantage of this approach would be the ease of including 
both clinical and managerial targets. 
(4) Leadership training should be available to ensure leaders have the necessary skills to address task, team, 
individual and environmental needs for effective team working. 
(5) Team training, learning and facilitation support should be made available. In particular, diversity 
management in teams requires more support. 
(6) Be clear about the operational objectives in promoting team-work and communicate: raising productivity or 
quality standards? To encourage innovation? To engage the talents and experience of all? To facilitate a clearer 
performance management framework to better integrate both clinical and management objectives? Ultimately 
these should bridge the needs for high volume, high quality and individual patient care.” 
 
Table 43: Six messages to be considered 
Bamford and Griffin 2008, p. 230 
 
Figure 6: Input, process and output model of team effectiveness 








INFORMATION AND CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH STUDY 
 
Study Title: Reducing waiting time for elective surgeries 
Researcher: Alexandru Popp 
Researcher’s Contact Information: Tel.: 514-487-5229. E-mail: alexwpopp@gmail.com 
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Kai Lamertz 
Faculty Supervisor’s Contact Information: John Molson School of Business, 1450 Guy St., MB. 
14.361, Montreal, Quebec, Canada, H3H 0A1.  Tel.: 514-848-2424 (ext. 4136). E-mail: 
kai.lamertz@concordia.ca 
Source of funding for the study:  
 
You are being invited to participate in the research study mentioned above. This form provides 
information about what participating would mean. Please read it carefully before deciding if you want to 
participate or not. If there is anything you do not understand, or if you want more information, please ask 




The purpose of the research is the identification of any direct links between the planning procedures 
performed by the hospital staff and the patients‘ waiting time for their elective surgeries.  
 
One of the goals of the study is to know the potential elements that influence the planning process for 
elective surgeries. These are directly related to how much time patients need to wait for their specific 




If you participate, you will be asked to participate in an interview that addresses the current procedures 
used to schedule elective surgeries and/or planning of the surgical schedule methodology.  
 
In total, participating in this study will take a maximum of one hour, the duration of the interview.  
 
As a research participant, your responsibilities are limited to your participation in an interview.  
 
C. RISKS AND BENEFITS 
 
There is no risk of any kind associated with the interview process.  
 




 Insight and feedback that might lead to potential improvements of your tasks or tasks related to 
the scheduling of elective surgeries; 
 A venue of providing your direct perception of how the scheduling process for elective surgeries 
is performed;  
 Contribution to different potential improvements of the current surgical planning system; 
 Your views will be incorporated in the overall analysis. Thus, your concerns and understanding of 
the processes will be taken in consideration;  
 




By participating, you agree to let the researcher(s) have access to information about the different 
processes involved in the planning of elective surgeries.  
 
We will not allow anyone to access the information, except people directly involved in conducting the 
research, and except as described in this form. We will only use the information for the purposes of the 
research described in this form. 
 
To verify that the research is being conducted properly, regulatory authorities might examine the 
information gathered. By participating, you agree to let these authorities have access to the information.  
 
The information gathered will be anonymous. That means that it will not be possible to make any link 
between you and the information you provide. The information that you provide will be aggregated to the 
level of your position. 
 
We will protect the information by the following:  
 The interview will be recorded via a digital recorder. This is done to ensure accuracy of the 
information provided once it is transcribed.  
 The interview data/information will be transferred onto a text digital format (Ms-Word), after 
which all the documents/papers used in the gathering of the data will be destroyed. Concordia 
University, under Records Management and Archives, has a secure destruction of documents 
program. More information about the destruction of confidential documents can be found at < 
http://archives.concordia.ca/shredding > 
 The data files will be encrypted on a USB key, where the entire storage device is encrypted. The 
USB key will be able to be read only on one specific computer. As a safety precaution, a backup 
USB key, having the same characteristics as the main storage device is created. The backup is 
performed daily. Furthermore, the USB key has an additional encryption/reading contingency: all 
the data will be stored on biometric USB keys where the fingerprint of the researcher is required 
for the access to the USB key(s).   
 
We intend to publish the results of the research. However, it will not be possible to identify you in the 
published results. 
 








F. CONDITIONS OF PARTICIPATION 
 
 
You do not have to participate in this research. It is purely your decision. If you do participate, you can 
stop at any time. You can also ask that the information you provided not be used, and your choice will be 
respected. If you decide that you do not want us to use your information, you must tell the researcher 







G. PARTICIPANT’S DECLARATION 
 
I have read and understood this form. I have had the chance to ask questions and any questions have been 
answered. I agree to participate in this research under the conditions described. 
 
NAME (please print)  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
SIGNATURE  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
DATE  _______________________________________________________________ 
 
If you have questions about the scientific or scholarly aspects of this research, please contact the 
researcher. Their contact information is on page 1. You may also contact their faculty supervisor.  
 
If you have concerns about ethical issues in this research, please contact the Manager, Research Ethics, 

























Appendix C: Interview questions  
Surgeons: 
 What are the patient‘s characteristics that are taken in consideration for the assessment for his/her 
surgery?  
 How is the patient‘s waiting time (for his/her surgery) taken in consideration? 
 What is the procedure to place a patient on the elective surgery waiting list? 
 If a patient is already on the waiting list, yet his/her condition degrades (but not to the point of 
emergency), what is the procedure to ‗upgrade‘ the patient on the waiting list (i.e. his/her 
placement)?  
 What are the processes required for a patient to be rescheduled due to unforeseen factors? 
 What is the process that a surgeon must undertake in order to secure enough OR time for his/her 
patients? What are the methods to allocate OR time for the surgeons and patients? 
 Please describe some of the disagreements between surgeons of the same unit regarding the OR 
allocation and how these are settled.  
 In your opinion, what are the divergences between surgical units, if there are any? 
 If there are tensions between you and the surgical staff, nurses, administrative staff involved in 
the planning of surgical scheduling, how are these resolved?  
 If there are some conflicts between units, what would those be? 
 What are the remedies used and/or sanctions applied if a surgeon performs the surgery in a longer 
or shorter time than the time allocated for the specific surgery in the OR? 
 From your perspective, what are some elements that surgeons would like to improve regarding 
the planning of elective surgeries? 




 What is the input that you are asked to provide to the unit regarding the elective surgical 
schedule? 
 What is the type of scheduling method done by your unit? 
 What is the rolling horizon for the elective surgery schedule in your unit? 
 If a patient is already on the waiting list, yet his/her condition degrades (but not to the point of 
emergency), what is the procedure to ‗upgrade‘ the patient on the waiting list (i.e. his/her 
placement)?  
 How is the OR time allocated within your unit?   
 What are the processes required for a patient to be rescheduled due to unforeseen factors? 
 If surgeries are taken longer/less time than the allocated time allocated, what are the effects of 
these on the following surgeries, and how are these addressed?  
 How is the master schedule coming together?  
 From your perspective, what are some elements that the administrative staff would like to 
improve? 




 What is your input, if any, in the assessment of a patient to be placed on the waiting list for 
elective surgery? 
 Why would there be some conflicts between the nursing staff and the surgeons of your own unit? 
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 If you are aware of, please describe some of the disagreements between surgeons regarding the 
OR allocation and how these are settled.  
 What are some potential disagreements between the staff in your unit and how are these resolved? 
 What are some of the tensions that your unit might encounter with other surgical units?  
 What is the type of work environment in your unit?  
 From your perspective, what are some elements that the nursing staff would like to improve? 







Appendix D: Coding categories 
 
Scheduling any information related  to the scheduling of patients 
In unit tensions are there tensions present or not in the unit 
Out unit tensions are there any tensions between units or surgeons of other units 
Surgery additional information about surgeries 
Centralization is centralization good or bad 
Decentralization is decentralization good or bad 
Interactions interactions between actors 
Impediments any impediments to the system 
Improvements any improvements to the system 
Admin. in unit is there an administrator in the unit that takes care of the OR allocation 
Allocation of OR how is the OR allocated and distributed between the surgeons of a unit 
Unit administration aspects in which the unit is administered/managed 
Problems in the unit any problems/issues that exist in the unit 
Problems in the hospital any problems/issues that exist in the hospital 
Hospital administration aspects in which the hospital is administered/managed 
Other any other aspects 
Surgeons aspects related to surgeons: what they want; do not want 
Nurses aspects related to nurse: what they want; do not want 














Appendix E: Surgical actual and estimated time 
 
 
   
Histogram C.T.V. 1: CTV 
surgical estimated duration 
Histogram C.T.V. 2: CTV 
surgical actual duration 










Histogram C.T.V. 1:  Historic wait times Histogram C.T.V. 2: Scenario 1 wait times 
  
Histogram C.T.V. 3:  Scenario 2 wait times Histogram C.T.V. 4: Scenario 3 wait times 










Histogram E.N.T. 1: Historical wait times Histogram E.N.T. 2: Scenario 1 wait times  
  
Histogram E.N.T. 3: Scenario 2 wait times Histogram E.N.T. 4: Scenario 3 wait times 


























Histogram General 1: Historical wait times Histogram General 2: Scenario 1 wait times  
  
Histogram General 3: Scenario 2 wait times Histogram General 4: Scenario 3 wait times 
























Histogram Ophtha. 1: Historical wait times Histogram Ophtha. 2: Scenario 1 wait times  
  
Histogram Ophtha. 3: Scenario 2 wait times Histogram Ophtha. 4: Scenario 3 wait times 








Histogram Neuro 1: Historical wait times Histogram Neuro 2: Scenario 1 wait times  
  
Histogram Neuro 3: Scenario 2 wait times Histogram Neuro 4: Scenario 3 wait times 
Histogram Neuro 0: Historical and scenarios results per patient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
